Teacher Collective Bargaining in Washington State: Assessing the Internal Validity of Partial Independence Item Response Measures of Contract Restrictiveness

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ABSTRACT

Recent research (Strunk and Reardon forthcoming) applies Partial Independence Item Response (PIIR) models to teacher bargaining agreements in California to calculate the latent restrictiveness of these contracts. Further research (Strunk and Grissom 2010; Strunk forthcoming) tests the external validity of these estimates. Given that much research on collective bargaining focuses either on high-profile provisions (Moe 2009) or categories of provisions (Koski and Horng 2007), it is important also to assess the internal validity of these estimates: are PIIR estimates of contract restrictiveness robust to analyses on different subsets of provisions? We introduce a new dataset derived from *all* provisions in *all* active CBAs in the state of Washington, and apply the PIIR methodology to calculate estimates of contract restrictiveness using the full range of provisions and various subsets of provisions. We find that estimates calculated from a subset of high-profile provisions are moderately highly correlated with estimates calculated from the full range of provisions, as are estimates calculated from several categories of provisions: Association rights, evaluation procedures, teacher benefit and leave policies, hiring and transfer provisions, and teacher workload agreements. However, estimates calculated using only grievance and layoff policies produce different results, suggesting that estimates using these contract sub-sections may capture another dimension of bargaining and lead to inappropriate inferences on the relationship between union strength and outcomes of substantive interest.

I. New Focus on Collective Bargaining

Increasingly policymakers aiming to raise student achievement have turned their attention to issues of teacher quality. The focus on teachers – and the variation in effectiveness of the teacher workforce – is driven by a growing body of research that shows teacher quality to be the most important schooling factor in students' academic success (Darling-Hammond 2000, Rockoff 2004, Rivkin, Hanushek, Kain 2005). While prominent in policy debates, less empirical attention has been paid to the governing mechanisms that may influence the quality and distribution of teachers within school districts.[1] Chief among these mechanisms are collective bargaining agreements (CBAs).

The overwhelming majority of states either permit or require public school districts to bargain a contract with their local teachers' union.[2] In addition to deciding *if* districts can bargain, states negotiate the scope of district bargaining (Cohen, Walsh and Biddle 2008). Issues from wages, hours, and course loads to school assignment, release and grievance may be subject to bargaining. In California and Massachusetts, for instance, class size is a mandatory bargaining item. Maryland and Oregon, by contrast, prohibit such negotiations. Layoff policies must be negotiated in Nevada and Iowa but are banned from the bargaining table in Hawaii. Each state's labor history and context guides these decisions (Cohen et al. 2008).

It is surprising that few empirical studies have focused on CBAs given that it is quite common for policymakers and pundits alike to point to CBAs, some CBA provisions in

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[1] The prominence of CBAs in policy debates was illustrated by recent events in Ohio and Wisconsin, where Republican governors, after significant political battles, rolled back union power to negotiate key collective bargaining provisions. Ohio voters later rejected these cutbacks via referendum.

[2] As of 2008, for instance, all but five states either permitted (11) or required (35) public school districts to bargain a contract with their local teachers' union (Hess and Loup, 2008). When collective bargaining agreements are prohibited or absent, provisions regulating teacher assignment and activity are often codified elsewhere, in state law or local board policy (Cohen et al., 2008; Hess and Loup, 2008).

particular (e.g. seniority-based job protections), as key inhibitors to effective school district operation and student achievement. A focus on CBAs is also timely given the federal government's Race to the Top grant competition incents states to make dramatic changes in teacher policies, many of which must be negotiated as part of the collective bargaining process.

In this paper we introduce a unique new dataset derived from *all* provisions included in *all* collective bargaining agreements in effect in Washington state in the 2010-11 school year, and report the findings from an analysis using Partial Independence Item Response (PIIR) models of contract restrictiveness (Stunk and Reardon forthcoming, Reardon and Raudenbush 2006). We use this measure to calculate the restrictiveness of every CBA in the state, and then test the internal validity of this measure on various subsets of provisions: an objectively derived "restricted" subset of provisions (Strunk and Reardon forthcoming), a subjectively derived subset of high profile provisions, and subsets of data corresponding to eight categories of provisions. This analysis is important because prior work on collective bargaining has generally focused either on high-profile provisions or a particular category of provisions and while the PIIR approach is a promising new method for analyzing CBAs, it is not clear whether studies that utilize this new methodology will be sensitive to the subset of provisions they consider (Koski and Horng, 2007; Moe 2009). To our knowledge, our dataset is the first to include the full universe of CBAs in a state, and this study is the first to assess the internal validity of the PIIR measure of contract restrictiveness.

We find generally high correlations between restrictiveness estimates calculated from different subsets of data. Cherry picked, high-profile provisions from a variety of contract sub-sections yield estimates similar to models based on all provisions. However, estimates from certain subsections of the contract – grievance and layoff – do not correlate highly with estimates calculated from the full data. And work relying only on layoff provisions may in fact lead to opposite conclusions than research informed by all provisions.

II. Background

A large literature on bargaining in the private sector suggests that competition between firms in a given industry limits private sector unions from demanding inflated benefits and wages (Clark et al. 2002). But public sector unions' viability depends on members' ability to persuade the public and elected officials that contracts and bargaining demands are instrumental to positive policy outcomes and not exclusively devoted to members' more narrow economic concerns (Klingner 1994).[3] Scholars have recently begun to explore the connections between collective bargaining and teacher workforce outcomes in education (Koski and Horng 2007; Levin et al., 2005; Moe 2005, 2009; Strunk 2010).

Detailed studies of bargaining in the education context focus on the provisions driving union "strength" or "power" and the influence of collective bargaining on outcomes like wages and student achievement. Most of these studies rely on simple indicators from one section of collective bargaining agreements to capture a union's strength in the bargaining process. For example, studies by Moe (2005, 2009) and Koski and Horng (2007) rely on measures of seniority-based transfer rights to assess the relationship between union strength and important teacher workforce outcomes.[4] Moe's work on the relationship between union power and student achievement relies on a similar uni-faceted measure. Carefully chosen

[3] Union election structures forge a positive connection between what teachers want and what their leaders actually do. When union leaders step out of line, collaborating when members seek to contest district reforms or supporting changes that members disavow, their tenure is short lived (Moe, 2011).
[4] Moe relies on a transfer rights scale, developed based on factor analysis of several seniority rights CBA provisions. Koski and Horng rely on six transfer rights provisions.

CBA provisions can inform our understanding of how these provisions influence specified outcomes. However, in highlighting particular cherry-picked provisions, work may overlook important tradeoffs in the negotiations process, and in doing so, provide a misleading picture of both union strength and the relationship between union demands and other important outcomes (e.g. student achievement).[5]

We argue that most existing studies on the influence of collective bargaining on teacher distribution and student outcomes do not go far enough in addressing sustained critiques of the bargaining literature. This is by no means a new issue. Kochan and Wheeler's study published in 1975 argues that to successfully advance the state of collective bargaining theories that utilize outcomes as the dependent variable, "1) outcomes should be conceptualized in a way that includes all (or a representative sample) of the relevant items of interest that form the content of negotiations; 2) a concept of union power should be developed that reflects the underlying complexity of forces affecting a bargaining relationship and that is susceptible to measurement; 3) the model should be tested empirically in order to assess its validity; and 4) the test should take place at the level at which bargaining actually takes place."

Existing studies that focus on particular subsections or provisions of collective bargaining agreements to the exclusion of others (Koski and Horng, 2007; Moe 2005, 2009) may ignore relevant items of interest (criterion 1) and therefore may not capture the complexity of forces driving contract negotiations (criterion 2). For instance, Koski and Horng (2006) and Moe (2006, 2009) focus on seniority-based transfer rights without regard to other potentially important contract provisions.

[5] For example, unions may agree to stricter evaluation standards in exchange for seniority-based transfer rights.

Recent work by Strunk and Reardon (forthcoming), on the other hand, seeks to quantify the latent restrictiveness of a teacher contract using a dataset of CBAs from a large, representative sample of California school districts that includes the *full-range of provisions* mentioned in contracts across California.[6] Specifically, they cleverly adapt Reardon and Raudenbush's (2006) Partial Independence Item Response (PIIR) model to teacher collective bargaining agreements by coding provisions in each CBA as "responses" to a conditionally-structured survey that addresses nearly every provision that could appear in a CBA. Their dataset and methods of analysis address Kochan and Wheeler's first two concerns, and research utilizing this measure of contract restrictiveness (Strunk and Grissom 2010, Strunk forthcoming) can therefore draw more robust conclusions because the measure is a function of *all* bargained provisions.

Strunk and colleagues have done further research to investigate the external validity of the PIIR restrictiveness measure. For example, Strunk and Grissom (2010) compare PIIR restrictiveness measures to a statewide survey of school board members in California and find that contracts in districts with stronger unions (measured both by school board members' evaluations of union power and union support of school board members in recent elections) allow school district administrators less flexibility than do contracts in districts with weaker, less active unions. This begins to address Kochan and Wheeler's third criterion (that all measures must be tested empirically), and we contribute to this effort in two important ways. First, we report the results of applying the PIIR methodology to our dataset of CBAs in Washington state. To our knowledge, this is only the second dataset analyzed in this manner, and this provides further evidence of the utility of this methodology. Second, we assess the

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[6] Only districts with at least 4 schools are included in Strunk and Reardon's analyses.

internal validity of the PIIR measure by estimating restrictiveness using various subsets of provisions: an objectively derived "restricted" subset of provisions (Strunk and Reardon forthcoming), a subjectively derived subset of high profile provisions, and subsets of data corresponding to eight categories of provisions.

III. Data Collection, Coding, and Measures of CBA Restrictiveness

Collective bargaining agreements from Washington state inform our analysis. Washington has 295 school districts, but 25 of these districts are not governed by a collective bargaining agreement. We collected the active CBA for each of Washington's 270 remaining districts in the 2010-11 school year.[7]

Collective bargaining agreements are written, legal documents. The length and detail of these documents preclude simple evaluation and comparison. In order to understand how collective bargaining agreements and the provisions they contain relate to one another and other outcomes of interest, it is necessary to encapsulate each agreement's contents in a concise, logical and consistent manner. To do this we follow a rubric adapted from that developed by Strunk (2009).[8] Strunk's rubric attempts to address all of the provisions that could appear in a CBA so that resulting data, like the CBAs themselves, capture information on the host of provisions included in the following sub-sections; association rights, transfers, vacancies and assignments, class size, evaluation, grievance procedures, health and welfare benefits, leaves,

[7] Many of these agreements span multiple years: see Appendix A. for the spans of our agreements.
[8] We made several modifications to Strunk's original coding scheme to reflect the Washington state context. We replaced several references to specific California education code with comparable Washington state law where applicable. We also added an entire section on layoff policies, since layoff policies are collectively bargained in Washington state (and addressed by state law in California.) Finally, after coding a representative sample of 75 CBAs, we added additional provisions—mainly to the layoff and evaluation sections—to capture the full range of provisions in Washington state. Our rubric considers 766 individual provisions across the sub-topics noted above. For more detail on the coding rubric and revisions to the rubric see Appendix A.

non-teaching duties and prep, school day hours, and year, professional development, and retirement.

CBA Coding

CBA coding was performed by undergraduate students at the University of Washington. All students were split into pairs who coded the same CBAs. Students independently coded each CBA then met with a partner to resolve coding discrepancies and provide a consolidated, agreed-upon record for each CBA. We use this consolidated coding in subsequent analyses.[9]

Our primary goal is to explore the extent to which different measures of contract restrictiveness agree with each other in providing a similar picture of the overall CBA. In calculating these measures of contract restrictiveness (which also may be judged as a measure of union power), we seek to capture key issues driving the outcome of management-union negotiations in each district. Moreover, we wish the measure to reflect the underlying complexity of CBAs. In pursuit of this goal, we code CBAs in a manner that treats each provision in a CBA as a "response" to a survey that includes all contract provisions covered in collective bargaining agreements.

Designing a measure of restrictiveness that adequately captures the complexity of contracts is not trivial. For instance, many important provisions in CBAs- such as the length of the school day, the negotiated class size in each grade, and number of leave days teachers receive – require a numerical response. Others – such as "Does this CBA include a no-strike clause?"

[9] We use each student's original coding to calculate a Cohen's Kappa score for each pair as a measure of inter-coder reliability. Scores range from .43 to .95 with an average score of .62. A Kappa score of 1 implies perfect agreement, which is rare. Scores ranging from .40 to .60 imply moderate agreement, .60 to .80 good agreement, and .80 to 1.0 a very high degree of agreement (Altman 1991). Final coding reliability should improve upon these Kappa scores as it reflects improvements made through careful joint review of each individual's original coding.

and "Are tenured teachers evaluated differently than non-tenured teachers?" invite dichotomous categorization. And many "responses" in a CBA are conditional to responses earlier in the CBA – for example, the response to "is seniority the only factor in selecting a teacher to voluntarily transfer?" is conditional on the response to "does seniority play *any* role in selecting a teacher to voluntarily transfer?"

Strunk and Reardon (2010) utilize a Partial Independence Item Response (PIIR) model to meet data challenges and obtain a measure of CBA "restrictiveness." PIIR models require a dichotomous response to each provision. Binary responses can be used to account for the conditional structure of response provision data. We use actual data from three districts in our sample to illustrate how our initial observed data, like Strunk and Reardon's, is transformed into a binary, conditional structure in preparation for PIIR analysis.

For each district contract, CBA coders "respond" to a series of questions regarding the important provisions noted above. The CBA provision rubric "asks" two types of question: gateway questions (GQ), and sub-questions (SQ).[10] Gateway questions (*always* answered in a 1 or 0) ask a coder whether or not a particular provision or topic is considered in the contract. These questions are followed by a series of additional questions that provide more detail on the structure of a particular provision. For example the rubric might ask the gateway question; "Does the CBA specify any factors that determine the order of layoffs in the event of a tie (in seniority)?" If the answer to this question is no (0), then the coder would move on to the next question and ignore the sub-questions following that particular gateway question. However, if the answer is yes (1), the coder goes on to answer additional questions that will show what

[10] Several gateway questions are followed by sub-gateway questions, additional questions that must be responded to in the affirmative in order for coders to proceed to the next item.

specific factors (education, performance, administrator discretion) or how many factors (4, 5, 6) determine how layoffs are done in that district.[11]

The sub-questions noted above illustrate one of the challenges posed by observed data. To get the most information out of each provision and each contract, coders may initially record a qualitative or numerical response to particular questions such as the length of a school day, the number of students in a class, the timelines used to file grievances, etc. The grievance questions selected below illustrate this point.

Question
1. Does CBA specify that a member should make an informal attempt to resolve a grievance before proceeding to formal grievance procedures?
1b. How long do members have to report a grievance?

Responses to these questions appear in what we term an observed response matrix. The observed response matrix for the entire dataset is 270 districts by 766 individual provision items. The observed response matrix for three selected districts appears below.

Observed Response Matrix		
	Question	
District	1	1b
Aberdeen	0	0
Almira	1	20 days
Castle Rock	1	10 days

Because the PIIR model requires a binary response, when all contracts are coded and combined we analyze the distribution of numerical response with an eye for cut off points that

[11] A list of all contract provisions appears in Table 5.

will preserve variance in information but allow a binary structure. Each numerical question is recoded as a series of increasingly restrictive questions that lend themselves to binary response.[12] Resulting response categories might be thought of as "bins." Each bin contains information from a minimum of 10 CBAs (Any question with fewer than 20 responses – enough to form 2 bins – was dropped from analysis, i.e. the gate question is the most restrictive information available on that particular provision). We allow up to 4 bins per question. Question 1b originally read "How long do members have to report a grievance?" This question has been recoded below to incite a binary response. Real frequencies from observed data are reported.

Question	Frequency in Data
1. Does CBA specify that a member should make an informal attempt to resolve a grievance before proceeding to formal grievance procedures?	230
1b. Is there a time limit on how long grievant has to report grievance?	135
1bi. At least 15 days?	123
1bii. At least 20 days?	106
1biii. At least 30 days?	43

A Binary Response Matrix results (this matrix has 270 districts by 633 binary provisions once we drop any provisions that applied to fewer than 10 districts). Binary responses for the three selected districts appear below.

[12] Since one of the goals of the PIIR model is to measure the "restrictiveness" of each CBA, we re-code each numerical question so that each successive question represents a greater "restriction" to the district. For example, *lower* mandated class sizes are more restrictive to a district, so we recode class sizes as "Is the negotiated class size in grade 4 no more than 27? No more than 25? etc." On the other hand, *more* teacher leave days are more restrictive to a district, so we recode leave days as "Do teachers get more than 3 bereavement days? More than 5 bereavement days? etc."

Binary Response Matrix					
	Question				
District	1	1b	1bi	1bii	1biii
Aberdeen	0	0	0	0	0
Almira	1	1	1	1	0
Castle Rock	1	1	0	0	0

The Partial Independence Item Response (PIIR) Model

We now redirect attention to the PIIR model. As noted above, the PIIR model treats each provision in a CBA as a binary "response" to a survey that includes all contract provisions covered in collective bargaining agreements. And since many "responses" in a CBA are conditional to responses earlier in the CBA—for example, the response to "is seniority the only factor in selecting a teacher to voluntarily transfer?" is conditional on the response to "does seniority play *any* role in selecting a teacher to voluntarily transfer?"—the PIIR model uses as the dependent variable the *conditional* probability that a provision appears in a CBA *given* that it is in the "risk set" for that CBA (i.e. the item in question could have appeared in the CBA given response to previous questions). Specifically, if Y_{ik} represents the outcome of provision k in contract i, and h_{ik} represents whether this provision is in the "risk set" for contract i, we can let $\varphi_{ik} = \Pr(Y_{ik} = 1 \mid h_{ik} = 1)$. The model is then:

$$\log\left(\frac{\varphi_{ik}}{1-\varphi_{ik}}\right) = \theta_i + \sum_{j=1}^{K} \gamma_j D_{ij} \qquad (1)$$

In model 1, the conditional probability of provision k appearing in contract i is a function of the latent restrictiveness of CBA i (θ_i) and the conditional "severity" of provision (γ_j).[13] D_{ij} is simply a dummy variable indicating which provision is considered. Thus, model 1 allows

[13] This approach is conceptually similar to a Rasch model (Rasch 1960) that calculates the probability of a student answering a question correctly on a test as a function of his or her latent ability and the latent difficulty of the question.

simultaneous calculation of the restrictiveness of each contract as a whole as well as the severity of each individual provision.

The dependent variable in equation 1 is conditional on each item being in the “risk set” for a particular CBA. Provision *k* is in the risk set for CBA *i* if it is a gate question or if it is a sub-question for which the gate question has been coded a 1 (therefore 0s and 1s will reflect actual response rather the absence of a response (all items in the matrix not purposely coded as present “1” are coded as 0)).

To build the “risk set” and further ready data for analysis, we follow the methodology of Reardon and Raudenbush (2006). We create a “gate matrix” that indicates whether or not an item is conditional on another (Gate) item (633 X 633). In this gate matrix, a 0 is recorded each time an item refers to itself (all zeros on the diagonal) and a 1 is recorded each time an item references (is conditional upon) the other item in question. Zeros are recorded throughout the rest of the dataset. The gate matrix corresponding to the grievance questions illustrated above appears below.

Gate Matrix					
Question	1	1b	1bi	2bii	2biii
1	0	0	0	0	0
1b	1	0	0	0	0
1bi	1	1	0	0	0
1bii	1	1	1	0	0
1biii	1	1	1	1	0

We use this “gate matrix” to form a “risk matrix” which indicates whether or not a provision is in the risk set for each CBA. CBAs that responded affirmatively to question 1 above could have responded affirmatively to 1b whether or not they actually did. Therefore question

1b is in the risk set for that CBA. Sub-questions are not in the risk set of any CBA that has a zero for any of its gate questions. The risk matrix for our example question appears below.

Risk Matrix					
	Question				
District	1	1b	1bi	1bii	1biii
Aberdeen	1	0	0	0	0
Almira	1	1	1	1	1
Castle Rock	1	1	1	0	0

Once we have this "risk matrix" we can limit the binary response matrix to only those observations that correspond to items in the risk set for a particular CBA. The resulting matrix is called the CBA - Item matrix and is a record of actual responses to each item considered in a particular CBA. The CBA-Item Matrix appears below.

CBA-Item Matrix						
District	Response	1	1b	1bi	1bii	1biii
Aberdeen	0	1	0	0	0	0
Almira	1	1	0	0	0	0
Almira	1	0	1	0	0	0
Almira	1	0	0	1	0	0
Almira	1	0	0	0	1	0
Almira	0	0	0	0	0	1
Castle Rock	1	1	0	0	0	0
Castle Rock	1	0	1	0	0	0
Castle Rock	0	0	0	1	0	0

The PIIR approach described above allows us to consider each CBA as a comprehensive document rather than subjectively pulling out specific CBA provisions that we (or others) may believe should have more or less influence on student and teacher outcomes. Each CBA can then be compared to every other CBA in the state, and by rubric design, the most restrictive district in the state should give management the least flexibility. However, two contracts by this measure may be considered equally restrictive if they have the same number of provisions (0s and 1s) even if they are "restrictive" in very different ways.[14] And it is quite likely that union and district representatives "trade" restrictiveness in one area of the contract for "leniency" in another. Therefore, like Strunk and Reardon, in addition to obtaining an objective measure of CBA restrictiveness informed by all provisions within the "risk set" for each CBA we also gather several other measures of restrictiveness.

The measure of contract "restrictiveness" based on all provisions is objective and detailed, but a measure relying on 633 contract provisions is not portable or easily replicated. Moreover, we use these restrictiveness estimates as the dependent variable in future analyses so we want to reduce the noise in this measure as much as possible. Therefore, like Strunk and Reardon we assess the 633 contract items employed in our full model to ensure that they are all contributing to the measurement of the underlying "restrictiveness" trait. Identifying any misfitting items allows those items adding more noise than signal to our measure of restrictiveness to be removed from our scale. The resulting scale should be both more reliable and user-friendly (as it is composed of fewer items).[15] We begin with a relatively high .67 contract reliability (compared to Strunk and Reardon's .572).

Like Strunk and Reardon, we base our item reduction on the unbiased statistical methods used in test construction. We run exploratory Cronbach's alpha analysis on all 633 items included

[14] And we cannot say whether this measure of contract "restrictiveness" is related to outcomes. We believe that a restrictive contract will restrict management practices in some sense. But a restrictive contract does not necessarily restrict management in ways that would be expected to lead to any particular outcome. To determine the relationship between a particular kind of restrictiveness and a particular outcome of interest we would still need to look at on-the-ground practices related to particular provisions. For example, a CBA may mandate that novice teachers are evaluated annually and the evaluation must consist of three classroom visits. This CBA would be seen as a more restrictive CBA than another district that did not mandate anything about the evaluation of novice teachers but we have no idea if what evaluation practices look like in either the district with "more restrictive" contract language or the district with no evaluation-related provisions.

[15] This does not mean the measure if more accurate. A measure that will yield the same response in repeated trials is "reliable" but may not be the best, or most complete, measure of a concept of interest.

in our initial model. We examine the item-total correlations produced for each of the 633 items. A low item-total correlation statistic for a specific item tells us that item fails to measure the concept captured by the other items. We follow a generally accepted standard used by test makers and Strunk and Reardon and objectively discard items with item-total correlations lower than 0.25 (Abedi, 2009; Strunk and Reardon, 2010). After an initial round of item reduction, we reassess our data and remove any further items that have item-total correlations below 0.25 based on the new scale with fewer items. After 3 iterations of this process, no items with item-total correlation below this threshold remain. We are left with an instrument of 218 items that span the breadth of the contract. The reliability of this measure increased slightly to .72 which indicates that the 415 discarded items were in fact capturing more noise than the underlying trait.[16] Unfortunately this "reduced" set is still not nearly as "user-friendly" as Strunk and Reardon's 39. This suggests that unlike California, in Washington one must consider a larger number of provisions to get a good gauge on the restrictiveness a particular CBA.

CBAs often follow a similar layout or formula. Association rights, evaluation, grievance procedures, layoffs, hiring procedures and transfers, benefits and leaves, and workload are discussed in specified contract subsections. The Strunk coding rubric used to create the data used in these analyses also categorizes provisions in this manner. And previous work has focused on particular provisions that may fall under the umbrella of one of these subcategories (workload, layoffs, hiring and transfers) (Koski and Horng 2007; Moe 2005, 2009; Moe and Anzia 2010). Discussions with teachers and district administrators lead us to believe that unions and district managers may bargain “trade-offs” between categories in order to come to a final, mutually beneficial agreement. Therefore, in addition to running PIIR analysis on our full and

[16] The results of fixed effects PIIR models run on the full and reduced dataset are highly correlated (.88).

reduced datasets to obtain district restrictiveness estimates, we also run PIIR analyses of the categories reported in Table 1 to determine whether or not districts that are "highly restrictive" in one category appear to be more or less restrictive in related categories.

Table 1: Subcategories for Analysis
Accessibility
Association
Evaluation
Grievance
Layoffs
Benefits and Leave
Hiring and Transfers
Workload

Each of the model specifications discussed above will provide different estimates of restrictiveness any of which may be useful depending on one's questions and goals. The full model provides an objective view of district restrictiveness, the reduced model provides a more reliable (though less detailed) and portable view. Each of the data subsets analyzed may be useful in a particular context. Our final model specification relies on high-profile provisions, those talked about in the popular press and cited in prior subjectively focused academic research (Koski and Horng, 2007; Moe, 2005, 2009). Table 2 lists the "cherry-picked" provisions included in our final analyses. These provisions should adequately capture a district's "visible" restrictiveness.

Table 2: Cherry-Picked Provisions
Accessibility How many provisions does the CBA contain (at least 170, at least 202, at least 227)? How many times is the district contacted to obtain the CBA (at least 2 times, at least 3 times)? How long is the CBA (at least 47 pages, at least 63 pages, at least 86 pages)? **Association** Is there a no strike/lockout clause/concentrated activities/work stoppage? Does the district pay for/cover any or all of the release time for negotiations for union members?

Hiring and Transfers

Does CBA address seniority as a factor in deciding who is voluntarily transferred?

Does CBA address seniority as a factor in deciding who is involuntarily transferred?

Does CBA specify the order in which district can consider new employees for vacancies?

If position opened within the school year is filled with probationary/temporary teacher, will it be re-opened the following year to members seeking transfer/reassignment?

Does CBA require that district post all certificated vacancies/make them available to teachers in the district?

Workload

Does the CBA have a maximum class size for 4th grade? 8th grade? 9-12th grades?

Is collaboration time set aside in CBA (separately from prep time) for 4th grade? 8th grade? 9-12th grades (high school)?

Does the CBA specify a given length of the school day in instructional minutes?

Evaluations

Does CBA/Evaluation rubric define the final rating categories?

Does CBA specify that permanent teacher with 4 years or more experience, who meets or exceeds standards on previous evaluation, or who is NCLB highly qualified can be evaluated on a different schedule?

Are there consequences for receiving a negative/"unsatisfactory" performance evaluation?

Does the CBA allow for teachers to rebut or appeal a negative evaluation?

Grievance

May the teacher grieve disciplinary action?

Does the grievance go to the board?

Does the grievance go to mediation?

Does the grievance go to arbitration?

Layoffs

Within credentialing area, is seniority the only primary factor that determines the order of layoffs (i.e., not just a tie-breaker)?

Does the CBA specify primary factors other than seniority that determine the order of layoffs?

Does CBA provide for recall rights after layoffs?

Does CBA specify how reemployment offers are made after layoffs?

Does CBA specify that reemployment offers are made in reverse seniority order after layoffs?

Can members reject a reemployment offer after layoff?

Leaves

Do members receive LOA for family illness/ family care leave?

Do members receive parenting/ child rearing leave?

Do members get pregnancy/ maternity leave time over the 6 month period promised to them in ec/state laws?

Does CBA specify what members' rights of return are from this leave?

IV. Restrictiveness Estimates and Internal Validity Assessment

We have described our data and a method of analysis (PIIR) that yields a measure of restrictiveness based on all provisions. This measure should capture both the content of negotiations and reflect the underlying complexity of forces affecting a bargaining relationship. How restrictive are the 270 teacher contracts in the state of Washington, and does the objective measure obtained via PIIR correlate with measures of restrictiveness that rely on a reduced set of provisions, particular subsets of provisions, or particular cherry-picked provisions utilized in prior research? In this section we present restrictiveness estimates for every CBA in our dataset, and discuss the relationship between measures of restrictiveness relying on various datasubsets.

We use our item-response data to obtain a "restrictiveness" measure for each contract and each provision in all 270 of Washington's CBAs. Restrictiveness estimates obtained via fixed-effects logit PIIR are presented in Column 2 of Table 3. All results have been standardized to have mean 0 and standard deviation one within each model.[17] Therefore, the magnitude of each coefficient should be interpreted in standard deviations of restrictiveness; for example, the CBA in Aberdeen School District is 0.24 standard deviations less restrictive that the average CBA in the state when we use the full range of provisions in our dataset (Column 2, Table 3). Column 3 of Table 3 displays each district's restrictiveness estimate based on the objectively-reduced dataset described above. Columns 4-11 of Table 3 present results by subsection of the CBA.

[17] The measure of contract restrictiveness obtained from a mixed effects model treating districts as fixed effects and provisions as random effects, yields highly correlated ($r > .99$) estimates, suggesting that the restrictiveness estiamates are robust to our specification of the provision effects. For simplicity, then, we only present results of the fixed effects model.

The final column of Table 3 provides district restrictiveness estimates based on the "cherry-picked" set of provisions identified in Table 2.

Table 4 displays the correlations between the PIIR estimates calculated from each subset of data. This presentation should be considered a first attempt at assessing the internal validity of the PIIR measure. Comparisons highlight similarities and key differences between estimates based on different subsets of data. The correlations are generally high, suggesting that latent restrictiveness in one category is predictive of latent restrictiveness in another category or in the contract as a whole.

The exceptions are restrictiveness in grievance policies (which is only weakly correlated with other subsets) and layoff policies (which is negatively correlated with estimates from other categories). Researchers who rely on grievance and layoff policy as a proxy for "union power" should take note as these results suggest that provisions from these contract sub-sections may capture another dimension of bargaining and lead to misleading results. That said, note that the restrictiveness estimates using only hiring and transfer policies are somewhat highly correlated (r = 0.59) with estimates based on the full sample. This gives evidence that prior work focusing only on these provisions (Koski and Horng 2007) may be capturing a measure of restrictiveness similar to a measure relying on the full range of provisions.

Also of particular interest is the moderately high correlation between the restrictiveness estimates using the cherry-picked provisions and using the entire contract (0.75). This suggests that—although our item reduction demonstrates that a large number of provisions are necessary to make conclusive inferences about contract restrictiveness—it is still possible to infer a great deal about the restrictiveness of a contract from a small subset of subjectively-chosen provisions. Thus future research relying on highly contested provisions across contract subsections may yield results similar to research relying on exhaustive, detailed coding of a near-complete universe of provisions.

V. Conclusions

Our results suggest that while the PIIR method is an important development in the analysis of collective bargaining outcomes, researchers do not necessarily need to code *every* provision in CBAs to utilize this methodology and draw meaningful conclusions from these agreements. Specifically, analyses that calculate PIIR estimates using a subset of high profile provisions across the contract or a category of provisions that appears to contribute to the latent restrictiveness of the contract—such as Association rights, evaluation procedures, teacher benefit and leave policies, hiring and transfer provisions, and teacher workload agreements—may capture a similar latent restrictiveness as analyses that utilize the full range of provisions. This is good news for researchers who are drawn to the utility of the PIIR methodology but do not have access to exhaustive datasets of CBA provisions.

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Appendix A: Protocol for collecting and coding collective bargaining agreements (CBAs)

To assess the relationship between collective bargaining agreements and the quality and distribution of the teacher workforce we rely on contract data from all school districts in Washington State. Transforming contract legalese into quantitative data requires a detailed coding strategy. Recently, Katharine Strunk developed a rubric designed to capture all provisions contained in teachers' union contracts (Strunk 2009). The rubric allows one to reduce long, detailed documents to a series of binary responses. We use Strunk's rubric, modified to suit the Washington State context, to assess the relationship between CBA provisions and the quality and distribution of the teacher workforce.

Prior to analyzing the relationship between CBA provisions and the quality and distribution of the teacher workforce in Washington State, it was necessary for us to 1) obtain a data collection instrument, 2) collect CBAs for all districts in Washington State that had such an agreement, 3) train a team of individuals to read, assess, and code the CBAs per the data collection instrument, and 4) consolidate the data generated from such coding for subsequent analysis. We review each of these processes below.

Obtain a Data Collection Instrument.

We use data captured by Katharine Strunk's CBA coding rubric in all of our analyses. Before employing Strunk's rubric, we modified several questions to reflect Washington State law and context. While much of the instrument could be used without modification, we replaced references to specific California state law with the comparable Washington state law, added questions to capture issues (such as layoff policies) covered by state law in California but left to district discretion in Washington, and made several minor changes to increase accessibility for our coders.[18]

Collect CBAs for all Districts in Washington State.

A CBA, as a contract agreement between a public entity (the school district) and a legal entity (the collective bargaining unit) is a public document and falls under Washington State's Public Records Act. Contracts should be "publicly accessible" and subject to review upon request of any person, however, there is no publicly-accessible cache of CBAs for certificated employees (teachers) in Washington State. As such, each CBA must be requested from an originating school district.

The State of Washington has 295 school districts. We requested a hard or electronic copy of all available CBAs between the school district and certified employees (teachers) from each district. We collected many CBAs from school websites (111 districts had CBAs on their district website or on the teacher union's website). After this initial round of online data collection, we began contacting individual districts by phone and email. These methods led to the collection of CBAs from an additional 80 districts. While many districts were extremely responsive and helpful, other districts were reticent to comply with our informal public records requests. When districts

[18] We clarified some language and terms, expanded some non-gateway questions, and added administrative detail to ease navigation and reference.

were not responsive to repeated phone/voicemail, or email requests, we faxed them a formal public records request (PRR) and followed up again via phone and email. This method led to the eventual collection of all remaining CBAs.

We collected CBAs from 270 of the 295 school districts in the state, with 447 CBAs collected in total. Many districts were able to provide multiple CBAs spanning several years. Additional CBAs from previous years were known as "sister" CBAs. The 25 remaining districts do not have union arrangements and therefore had no CBA.

CBAs vary in their legal endurance. The majority of CBAs from the 270 districts in our sample (81%) had a legal span of two or three years. About 12% of contracts covered only one year and were renegotiated annually. The remaining contracts were four or more years in span. The average legal span for all CBAs was 2.5 years.[19]

CBA LENGTH AND FREQUENCY

SPAN IN YEARS	N	%
1	33	12.22%
2	81	30.00%
3	138	51.11%
4	12	4.44%
5+	6	2.22%
TOTAL	**270**	**100%**

AVERAGE SPAN = 2.54 YEARS

Train a team to code CBAs.

Undergraduate statistics, sociology, political science and economics students from the University of Washington coded the majority of CBAs for this project. The Center for Education Data and Research (CEDR) advertised through departmental internship coordinators and data-related courses within each department. Nineteen students began coding in the spring quarter of 2011. Most of these students took a directed research course or received internship credit through CEDR, with the understanding that their work was to code CBAs during the bulk of the term in exchange for access to data to do their own analysis at the end of the quarter. In addition to normal intern/directed research work, we held intensive week-long coding sessions between quarters. These were intended to make maximum use of the training and experience of coders, and maintain skills between school breaks.

[19] Though contracts are negotiated and legally binding for a specified period, some districts appear to rely on expired contracts and renegotiate infrequently. For example, Queets-Clearwater, a very small district of approximately 30 students, negotiated a contract to span 1995-1997. It was amended in 2000 (leaving a gap between 1997 and 2000) but has remained otherwise untouched since then. As of 2012, Queets-Clearwater operates under this agreement. This is an extreme case, but it was not uncommon for us to find large gaps between legal spans of CBAs. Therefore, though these instances may be a reflection of district compliance with our efforts to collect CBAs, it may also provide a signal of contract strength or restrictiveness.

The training process for each student was similar. All students read several background documents detailing project goals and operations and their role in the project. Each student then took home a CBA and used the data collection instrument to code the entire document. In one week's time, all the students met again to compare coding and to provide a unified (or agreed-upon) coding rubric for the CBA in question. This process was facilitated by Research Assistants Roddy Theobald and Lesley Lavery.

Once the initial training was complete, the students broke into groups of two or three (based on the number of credits they were taking) and were assigned CBAs to code for the following week. Students independently coded the assigned CBAs (1-7 per week, depending on alacrity and credit load) at home or school, then met with their partner to resolve coding discrepancies and provide a consolidated, agreed-upon data set for all assigned CBAs. This process was repeated each week until the conclusion of the quarter.



Consolidate the data.

The coding rubric (our instrument) and all coding data from the students were constructed and contained in Excel spreadsheets. All coders were instructed to provide headings in a specific format to make data consolidation a simple process of cutting-and-pasting from individual CBA coding spreadsheets to a combined spreadsheet.

Coders sent a final, agreed upon coding for each CBA to a CEDR staff member each week. This staff member then compiled multiple groups' coding in a "Meta" dataset which contained the individual and consolidated coding for each individual and group for each CBA. Cohen's Kappa scores were calculated using this dataset to determine inter-coder reliability. Finally, from the "Meta" dataset we distilled the consolidated coding (the agreed-upon coding for every CBA coded) for final analysis. A resulting "Master" dataset was then divided into two additional datasets: one with only the most recent CBA for each district—the data used in the bulk of our analyses—and another with the coding of sister CBAs.

Summary.

Our protocol for collecting and analyzing CBAs for this research was characterized by four distinct steps: 1) obtain a data collection instrument, 2) collect CBAs for all districts in Washington State, 3) code the CBAs, and 4) consolidate the data. The most labor-intensive portion of this process involved coding the CBAs. Undergraduate students from the University of Washington, supervised by CEDR researchers coded all 270 CBAs employed in subsequent analyses. Coders answered an exhaustive list of questions about each CBA. The analytical methods chosen for this project require that each response be in a binary format. Therefore, after all CBAs were coded, research assistants transformed data via the process explained in the body of this paper. The final, transformed, coding rubric contained 764 total questions.

The intensive data collection and coding process described here allows us to explore the relationship between collective bargaining agreements and the quality and distribution of the teacher workforce. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time such analysis has been attempted in Washington State.

Table 3: Model Restrictiveness Estimates

District	Full	Restricted	Cherry Picked	Accessibility	Association	Evaluation	Grievance	Layoffs	Benefits & Leave	Hiring & Transfers	Workload
ABERDEEN	-0.2378	-0.1434	-1.3022	0.6181	0.4499	0.0455	-2.4932	-0.5921	0.1991	-1.0126	0.1464
ADNA	-1.0002	-0.7007	0.6039	-1.8341	-0.5005	-1.7024	0.0560	-0.6284	0.2866	0.7991	-0.8690
ALMIRA	-1.7286	-0.4646	-1.2391	-1.7151	-1.2190	-3.2862	-0.0538	0.0334	-0.7910	-2.0644	-0.3593
ANACORTES	0.2466	0.3447	1.3904	0.0301	0.2380	-0.2829	0.7602	-1.3843	0.3971	0.4988	0.4150
ARLINGTON	0.0410	0.1937	-0.3438	0.0301	-0.1424	0.1754	-1.4382	1.2662	-0.6801	-0.5877	0.4770
ASOTIN-ANATONE	0.9819	0.5835	0.7543	0.3314	0.1816	0.1391	0.9263	0.7979	1.4902	0.2336	0.8487
AUBURN	0.3803	1.0029	-0.1236	0.6981	1.0196	-0.7497	-0.7337	0.0387	-0.3447	0.3372	0.8416
BAINBRIDGE ISLAND	0.4280	0.7458	0.0988	0.6981	0.7999	-0.0215	-0.6753	1.2662	-0.6847	0.1951	0.6477
BATTLEGROUND	0.2119	0.0311	0.3247	0.0301	-0.0209	0.0992	0.8534	1.3565	0.7319	0.3966	-0.1185
BELLEVUE	0.0539	0.6604	-0.7204	0.2913	0.0101	-0.0802	-2.0873	0.5405	-0.7262	1.0345	0.3144
BELLINGHAM	-0.4223	-0.8225	-0.2713	0.0301	-0.2287	0.4812	-0.4358	-1.4041	1.3373	-0.2201	-0.8839
BETHEL	0.1455	0.1314	0.5558	0.6981	1.6019	0.0722	-2.2569	0.2321	-0.2661	1.1402	-0.3448
BLAINE	1.3099	1.1253	1.0664	0.6040	0.5866	0.9885	0.7586	0.6720	0.6419	1.3903	0.7634
BOISTFORT	-1.8271	-1.5823	-0.9225	-0.5445	-1.3636	-0.9150	-0.0460	-2.6292	-0.9598	-0.7639	-2.1982
BREMERTON	-1.7251	-2.2632	-0.5933		0.5564	-5.9451	-0.6918	0.0387	0.1062	0.2259	-2.5251
BREWSTER	0.6489	0.2677	-0.1176	-0.8866	-0.4153	1.4932	0.9270	1.8391	0.3586		0.4155
BRIDGEPORT	0.1951	-0.0703	0.6618	0.1910	-0.3350	-0.3402	0.6911	0.7979	0.5359	-2.1680	0.5680
BRINNON	-0.8774	-0.9218	0.0011	-0.1067	-0.5900	0.1382	-1.0560	0.7063	-1.0033	0.1892	-1.6183
BURLINGTON-EDISON	-0.0956	0.5485	0.2436	0.6981	0.1198	-0.6752	-1.3275	-0.1699	-1.0441	0.0362	0.5983
CAMAS	0.3429	0.4114	0.6616	0.0301	0.4958	0.1758	1.4724	0.7063	0.4744	0.2389	-0.0297
CAPE FLATTERY	0.4256	0.1032	-1.5682	-1.8341	0.3359	0.3565	-0.5416	0.0387	0.3719	-0.1758	0.7823
CASCADE	1.2931	1.0757	1.8711	1.5872	1.1615	2.0070	0.3883	-0.1699	-0.9001	0.4313	0.7723
CASHMERE	0.3748	0.6277	0.7330	0.9383	-0.6537	0.6685	-0.8701	0.1535	-1.4739	0.4247	0.8104
CASTLE ROCK	0.1320	0.0816	0.2097	1.7784	-0.2256	0.6061	0.7756	1.8391	-1.0329	0.1288	-0.0648
CENTERVILLE	-2.6956	-3.4756	-1.8000	-0.5445	-2.0158		-1.6849	0.0387	0.2295		-0.3430
CENTRAL KITSAP	-0.0913	-0.0295	-0.7925	0.2913	-0.1783	-0.1687	-0.5035	1.3216	-0.7936	0.8464	-0.0710
CENTRAL VALLEY	0.5219	0.8321	0.3247	0.0301	0.2815	0.9942	0.1896	-1.6635	0.4472	-0.0164	0.4220

CENTRALIA	-0.2226	-0.4059	-0.1427	-0.8866	0.8111	-0.0296	0.4711	-0.6507	-0.1514	0.4589	-0.4034
CHEHALIS	0.8140	0.4229	1.2821	0.6181	0.6451	1.4025	1.1033	0.0387	0.3436	-1.1470	0.4443
CHENEY	1.3180	2.1684	0.8592	1.5872	0.1392	0.6779	1.4185	-0.5921	-0.3533	-0.5636	1.5514
CHEWELAH	-0.3806	-0.9092	0.5449	-0.4440	-0.0558	-0.2634	-0.4447	0.0387	1.8222	0.7441	-1.5020
CHIMACUM	-0.2301	0.5691	-0.6488	-1.0778	0.2547	-0.2671	-0.7731	-0.9280	-2.4529	-0.3301	0.6413
CLARKSTON	0.8446	0.4701	1.0719	1.7784	0.6058	0.8740	0.8203	-0.3064	-0.1593	1.2650	0.2799
CLE ELUM-ROSLYN	-0.0840	-0.4229	0.0885	-0.4440	-0.5370	0.2671	1.8790	-0.5921	0.7743	0.6883	-0.9817
CLOVER PARK	1.1635	1.4711	1.5498	1.5872	1.3606	-0.6597	-1.0649	-0.1699	1.7980	0.8343	1.2939
COLFAX	-1.4825	-0.6481	-2.3117	-1.8420	-1.7421	-0.7472	0.8340	-1.2966	-1.4462	-0.4423	-1.0386
COLLEGE PLACE	0.2862	-0.1551	0.4938	0.6040	-1.7421	0.9716	1.9675	-0.3996	0.0123	0.6431	-0.3307
COLTON	0.1262	0.1115	-0.2308	-0.0984	-0.0783	-0.1043	-0.3748	0.7063	0.5894		0.6609
COLUMBIA (STEV)	-0.4427	-1.5547	-0.8315	-0.1067	-0.9006	0.4054	1.0001	-1.2338	0.8198		-2.2348
COLUMBIA (WALLA)	-0.6232	-0.2246	-0.4256	-0.4539	-2.0413	0.6877	0.3129	-0.5921	0.1621	-0.8257	-0.6622
COLVILLE	0.8760	-0.0487	1.6532	1.7784	1.2137	1.3475	1.3779	-0.1699	-0.6356	1.2559	-0.8172
CONCRETE	0.2944	0.7302	1.1232	0.6040	-0.2635	0.0920	-0.8869	0.1535	-1.0404	0.2982	0.9226
CONWAY	0.6103	0.5345	-0.6818	0.0301	-0.1201	0.9086	1.3090	-1.5531	0.2156	0.8258	0.3425
COSMOPOLIS	-1.1452	-1.4858	-1.4549	-1.7151	-0.8508	-0.2798	0.3727	0.7803	0.1754		-1.2208
COULEE-HARTLINE	-0.2597	-0.6943	-0.0023	-0.0984	-0.3518	0.4363	0.7753	0.7063	0.5111	-1.3556	-0.4132
COUPEVILLE	0.0568	-0.0186	0.5558	0.6981	0.6200	0.2930	0.4404	-0.1699	-0.4991	0.4219	-0.1058
CRESCENT	0.9314	1.6748	0.3258	-0.4539	0.8069	0.8018	-0.2353	0.7063	-0.7415	0.0955	1.5596
CRESTON	-0.8800	-1.7466	-0.4633		-4.4224	0.4908	-0.0044	0.0387	-0.9030	-0.8874	-1.5859
CURLEW	-0.9351	-1.4927	-0.7625	-0.5445	-1.2343	1.0364	0.7539	0.2321	-1.5904	-0.7558	-1.5331
CUSICK	0.1230	-0.2549	0.0760	0.1910	0.7112	-0.3320	0.4860	0.0387	0.8586	0.6592	-0.3181
DARRINGTON	0.6631	0.2515	0.0760	0.1910	0.4192	1.1990	-0.6247	0.0387	0.0300	0.7874	0.1975
DAVENPORT	-0.8140	-0.2586	-0.3716	-0.0984	-0.4936	-0.4371	-0.7443	0.0387	-2.0093	-1.0829	0.0140
DAYTON	-0.2272	-0.2835	-0.3716	-0.9476	-1.0811	-0.4877	0.7821	0.7979	0.7372	0.1445	-0.1278
DEER PARK	1.1659	0.9785	0.6481	1.5872	0.5504	1.1168	1.1710	0.7063	0.3304	-0.6549	0.9270
DIERINGER	0.4599	0.1781	1.7582	1.3459	0.3777	-0.1361	1.2401	1.2662	0.7288	0.2951	0.2042
EAST VALLEY (SPK)	0.2216	0.7264	0.9288	0.2913	0.7594	-0.5719	0.5996	-0.1699	-0.7620	0.0113	0.6520
EAST VALLEY (YAK)	0.2607	0.7365	0.9288	0.2913	0.7594	-0.4434	0.5996	0.0387	-1.0339	-0.0457	0.6520
EASTMONT	1.4133	1.2637	0.7940	0.6981	1.1013	1.0947	-0.9029	0.1633	0.7142	0.4677	1.3399

EASTON	0.3942	0.5221	0.0420	0.1910	-0.0692	-0.1331	-0.9606	-0.8861	1.0927	0.3967	0.7035
EATONVILLE	0.9033	0.1481	0.8812	0.6040	0.1939	1.0366	1.0556	1.8391	0.3327	-0.7121	0.6434
EDMONDS	0.8093	0.7463	0.8853	1.5872	1.0248	0.0141		0.1535	2.2499	1.0556	0.5658
ELLENSBURG	-0.1631	-0.4103	-0.2008	-0.8858	-0.3518	-0.1318	0.8394	0.7063	-0.6751	-1.6343	0.5411
ELMA	0.1776	0.2437	-0.2208	0.4151	0.1884	-0.0616	0.0255	0.6720	-0.1882	0.6187	0.2011
ENDICOTT	-1.2317	-0.9555	-0.3191	-0.1067	-1.4353	-1.1449	0.1358	1.8009	-1.6842	-0.8874	-0.5459
ENTIAT	-4.0308	-4.5899	-2.1201	-1.7151	-1.2742		-1.6105	0.5875	-1.8664		-3.0449
ENUMCLAW	0.2679	-0.1063	-0.3438	0.0301	-0.0585	-0.0667	0.9413	0.7803	1.5194	0.6567	-0.2533
EPHRATA	1.2915	0.7486	1.3604	1.3459	0.3110	0.9517	0.2588	0.6720	2.1580	0.3823	0.7063
EVERETT	0.4246	0.5245	0.0885	0.2913	0.9659	-0.4003	0.4621	-0.5921	-0.4158	0.9854	0.4371
EVERGREEN (CLARK)	0.9689	0.3631	2.6177	1.5872	1.4028	1.0255	-0.5857	0.7063	0.6194	1.3978	0.0838
FEDERAL WAY	1.2555	1.8105	0.5558	1.5872	1.0229	0.2738	0.3176	1.3216	-0.4488	0.4071	1.4792
FERNDALE	0.6937	0.2209	0.8942	0.0301	1.6166	0.2734	-0.1767	-0.1699	0.6637	1.1933	0.0035
FIFE	0.2465	0.0759	-0.8473	-1.0778	1.0863	0.1241	1.1951	0.2321	-0.4429	-0.1268	0.0888
FINLEY	-0.4853	0.0745	0.7088	-0.0984	-0.1056	-0.6674	0.3744	0.1535	-0.8255	-1.0488	0.2448
FRANKLIN PIERCE	0.9214	0.9319	0.8942	1.5872	1.6336	0.1596	0.0502	-0.3064	0.0872	0.6886	0.8165
FREEMAN	0.0745	0.2016	-0.6588	-1.0778	-0.2279	-0.0654	0.7852	-0.5661	0.9513	-1.1651	0.3517
GARFIELD	-0.1949	-0.9202	0.1888	-1.0778	-0.0968	1.0766	0.7921	-1.6635	-0.5556	0.5469	-1.0329
GLENWOOD	-0.0266	0.4138	0.0082	-0.0984	-2.5288	0.1026	0.4231	0.7063	-0.1411	-0.9685	0.9209
GOLDENDALE	-0.5379	-0.0967	0.6814	0.4240	-1.3401	-0.0957	-0.5225	-0.1273	-0.2148	-0.6691	0.1873
GRAND COULEE	0.4506	0.7377	0.6809	-0.4539	-0.2689	0.1075	0.1168	0.3114	-0.2026	0.1511	0.8566
GRANDVIEW	0.3464	0.4467	0.0880	0.0301	0.5292	-0.5157	1.0208	-0.5661	-0.1875	1.3252	0.2324
GRANGER	-0.2351	0.0986	-0.2308	-0.0984	-1.0022	-0.8022	-0.5122	0.1633	-0.1367	-0.8874	0.7553
GRANITE FALLS	0.9001	0.3355	1.7331	1.7784	0.9293	0.7698	0.9071	0.1535	1.0373	1.1945	-0.1293
GRAPEVIEW	-0.5242	-0.7470	-2.9424	-1.8341	-2.1973	0.2021	0.7876	-0.8861	1.1732	0.0116	-0.5784
GREAT NORTHERN	-2.9661	-1.9631	-1.5201	-0.5445	-1.0071	-2.4717	-1.3456	0.0387	-2.2512	-2.6507	-2.0031
GREEN MOUNTAIN	-0.6831	-0.4134	-1.2150	-1.7151	-0.6245	0.5345	-0.0015	-1.0230	-1.4419	-2.8773	-0.2091
GRIFFIN	-0.1629	-0.6076	-0.8274	-0.8866	-0.8476	0.7547	-0.6034	2.4295	0.2645	-0.9782	-0.2418
HARRINGTON	0.5168	0.5308	0.2988	-0.8866	-0.0968	0.5317	0.7651	1.2934	-1.3456	-0.1568	1.1468
HIGHLAND	-1.1040	-0.9486	-0.6466	0.4240	-0.9025	0.2931	-1.6279	0.1535	-0.8711	-0.2727	-1.1305

HIGHLINE	2.2039	1.1867	3.1232	1.5872	0.9983	0.7599	1.6127	1.3456	2.8100	1.8007	1.2206
HOCKINSON	-1.0221	-0.7830	-0.5671	0.4240	-1.0770	-1.2702	-0.9427	0.7979	-0.7143	-0.9082	-0.2100
HOOD CANAL	-0.0741	-0.7067	-0.6002	-1.8341	-0.2449	1.4843	-0.4810	0.7063	0.5791	-1.0668	-0.4508
HOQUIAM	-0.4741	0.0638	-0.9640	0.6181	1.3173	-0.5142	0.1887	-1.0392	-1.5964	-0.0225	-0.4203
INCHELIUM	-0.4532	-1.1616	-0.1779	-1.0778	0.6547	0.6534	0.7900	-1.8991	-0.2270	-1.5931	-0.8524
ISSAQUAH	1.3057	1.4720	0.4434	1.5872	0.6545	0.4642	0.2970	0.0387	0.2462	1.0374	1.1925
KAHLOTUS	-0.6583	-1.5388	-0.8735		-0.9416	0.1472	-1.4127	-0.3064	1.1449	-0.0061	-1.6292
KALAMA	-0.4681	-0.3160	-0.2265		-0.0983	0.0564	0.1288	-1.2338	0.5111	-0.9881	-0.2013
KELSO	0.0735	0.0850	-0.5788	-0.0360	0.8526	-0.6045	1.1563	0.3114	0.3325	-0.2111	0.0050
KENNEWICK	0.6885	0.5865	1.1362	0.6981	1.0291	0.6971	0.8795	1.8391	1.5921	0.0705	-0.2009
KENT	-0.0500	0.3610	1.1362	1.5872	0.6856	-0.0677	-0.6741	1.2934	-1.0675	0.2714	0.0167
KETTLE FALLS	0.1718	0.4553	0.9420	0.6981	-1.2694	-0.0043	-0.0041	0.3114	-0.1955	0.6284	0.4385
KIONA-BENTON	-0.1383	-0.5714	-0.9879	0.6040	0.3787	1.0085	-1.4076	0.4962	0.2431	-0.1948	-0.6092
KITTITAS	-1.5502	-2.5238	-0.4644	-0.9557	-0.5673	-0.1739	-0.4058	1.2934	-0.3454	-0.6713	-3.8210
KLICKITAT	-1.3317	-0.2196	-0.5933		-2.1090	-0.3203	-2.8566	-0.8427	-0.3159	-0.2684	-0.4857
LA CENTER	0.0610	0.0443	0.5069	0.0301	0.1412	-0.0502	1.0098	1.8391	-0.7994	-0.0766	0.1726
LA CONNER	1.1628	1.3455	0.7543	1.7784	0.8366	0.5425	-0.5612	0.7060	0.0753	-0.4485	1.4737
LACROSSE	0.0062	-2.0466	-0.6935	-1.7151	-0.2722	0.6979	1.1584	1.2662	1.0931	-2.8773	-1.8396
LAKE CHELAN	0.6715	0.6993	-0.1647	0.0301	0.0493	0.2781	1.5390	-4.7000	0.0324	-0.4581	1.2191
LAKE QUINAULT	-0.9837	-0.7542	-1.3313	-0.9557	0.4100	-1.6967	0.8674	0.0387	-0.9191	-0.4322	-0.5303
LAKE STEVENS	1.8287	1.4733	1.6602	1.5872	1.4891	0.7703	-0.2051	0.1290	2.2373	0.9771	1.2461
LAKEWASHINGTON	1.6825	1.5566	1.5498	0.6981	1.7540	1.0316	0.7766	-0.5921	0.1987	1.8491	1.0563
LAKEWOOD	0.3515	0.4422	1.2187	1.7784	0.5526	-0.1549	0.3951	-0.3064	0.0110	1.5989	-0.0306
LAMONT	-0.9273	-1.4805	0.4610	-0.9557	-0.9006	-0.3227	0.2283	0.1535	-0.0988	-3.7701	-0.6655
LIBERTY	-2.8656	-3.0520	-0.3053	0.0017	-0.6537	-4.0657	-1.0346	1.2934	-1.6648	-1.8320	-3.7476
LIND	-0.3105	-1.1517	-0.1628	-0.3185	0.0112	0.3430	-0.1323	0.7063	0.1499	-1.9183	-0.3658
LONGVIEW	0.1395	-0.1154	0.0293	0.6981	0.5623	0.3025	1.0064	0.7979	-1.0891	1.0868	-0.4726
LOON LAKE	-2.3001	-1.1247	-1.7952	-1.7151	-0.4805		-0.6168	1.3216	-3.8652	-1.1470	-0.6680
LOPEZ	-0.5164	-0.4205	-0.3569	-0.0360	-0.8322	-0.1117	0.0443		0.1747	-0.4826	-0.2848
LYLE	-1.0624	-1.0450	-1.5805	-0.9557	-0.7783	-0.0925	0.6360	0.7979	-1.7775	-1.1951	-0.9294
LYNDEN	-0.2239	0.0746	-0.3533	-0.4440	0.2445	0.0121	1.5196	0.0387	-1.2262	0.0797	-0.3237

MABTON	-0.1843	0.1670	-0.5838	0.1910	-1.3401	-0.2419	-1.0000	0.2321	0.1894	-0.6833	0.4892
MANSFIELD	-0.9057	-1.2626	-1.7514	-1.7151	-0.3156	0.1187	-0.5145	-2.0215	0.5014	-1.2632	-0.8893
MANSON	0.6056	-0.3473	-1.0758	-0.8866	-0.1617	1.6581	2.4769	-0.8861	2.1043	-1.5713	-0.5543
MARY M KNIGHT	0.2037	0.1220	-0.6527	-0.0360	-0.7377	0.1010	-0.2891	-0.5921	1.5679	0.3412	0.2282
MARY WALKER	-3.0659	-2.0462	-2.3343	-1.7151	-1.9314		0.0329	0.2321	-0.6400		-1.6811
MARYSVILLE	1.1338	0.8038	0.2164	1.5872	0.5582	0.6633	0.0287	0.0334	1.2869	-0.0954	1.0922
MCCLEARY	-0.8175	-0.8226	-1.1370	-0.5155	0.3121	-0.3553	0.9912	-1.0230	-0.5630	0.3507	-1.4583
MEAD	1.3142	1.9087	1.4707	1.5872	1.3290	0.2475	-0.2590	-0.9035	0.2778	0.7593	1.4811
MEDICAL LAKE	1.2138	0.9276	0.7424	0.6981	0.4032	0.9459	0.2506	0.0534	0.8710	1.0352	0.8576
MERCER ISLAND	0.6886	0.3016	0.5069	0.6981	1.4282	0.5580	-1.0110	0.1535	1.4999	0.9482	-0.0201
MERIDIAN	1.1214	0.9626	0.5498	0.2765	0.5338	1.3219	-1.0218	-0.5501	1.2672	0.8154	0.8084
METHOW VALLEY	1.3709	1.2713	0.9726	0.4151	0.6547	0.1819	1.0185	0.7063	0.5765	0.2507	1.5051
MILL A	-1.3127	-2.1782	-1.2379	-1.7151	-2.4906	0.2042	-0.5243	0.1535	-0.7003	-0.6419	-1.8724
MONROE	-0.2791	0.3702	-0.0373	0.2913	1.1758	-0.2832	-1.8468	-0.8427	-1.0004	-0.0539	0.1564
MONTESANO	1.3597	0.9415	0.7879	0.2765	0.2725	1.7180	-0.5165	0.1290	1.1960	1.1755	0.7462
MORTON	0.1968	-0.2214	-0.3120	-0.9476	-0.9006	0.6120	0.2284	0.2321	1.1345	0.7681	-0.9648
MOSES LAKE	1.0482	0.4323	0.6809	0.2765	1.4674	-0.2634	1.1818	0.7979	2.0010	1.7802	0.0010
MOSSYROCK	-1.4057	-1.6641	-1.3784		-0.3965	-0.4554	-1.4309	-0.3064	-1.2677	1.0818	-3.3643
MOUNT ADAMS	-0.7339	-1.3150	-0.6866	-0.3185	0.1816	-0.4774	-0.9925	0.2321	0.8705	1.0449	-2.1741
MOUNT BAKER	0.4527	1.2958	-0.0082	0.6181	0.5186	0.1517	-1.0158	0.2338	-0.7437	0.4856	1.2475
MOUNT VERNON	-0.3631	0.4282	0.2164	0.0301	0.2708	-0.3223	-5.2552	-1.9395	-0.3821	0.5349	0.2830
MUKILTEO	0.5690	0.8467	-0.1339	0.6981	1.7230	0.2860	-1.3689	-2.1462	0.1043	0.7901	0.4016
NACHES VALLEY	0.2410	0.8384	-0.4986	-1.0778	-0.1056	-0.5262	-1.1710	-0.8427	0.0518	-0.6792	1.3588
NAPAVINE	-1.2166	-0.7471	-0.6851	-0.9476	-1.0022	-0.7435	-0.4492	0.0387	-0.5243	-1.8112	-0.4180
NASELLE-GRAYS	-0.1671	0.4830	-0.0430	-1.0778	-0.8040	-0.6029	0.0949	-0.1699	-0.6719	-0.2355	0.7773
NESPELEM	-1.2189	-0.7018	-1.0884	-0.9557	-1.7973	-0.5237	-0.7931	-0.6507	-1.0094	-0.9782	-0.3392
NEWPORT	0.5204	0.4599	0.4363	0.6981	0.4170	-0.0661	-1.3459	-0.3064	0.4460	1.2949	0.5989
NINE MILE FALLS	-0.1691	0.2700	0.3330	-0.4440	-0.3141	-0.4477	0.9420	0.6720	-0.5569	0.2111	0.0812
NOOKSACK VALLEY	-0.6046	-0.0521	-0.0347		0.3769	-3.5976	0.7254	0.0387	0.7881	0.2419	-0.4760
NORTH BEACH	-0.8494	-0.4615	-0.6465	-0.5445	-1.0176	-0.3217	-0.3441	-0.3064	-0.7909	-0.4425	-0.1478
NORTH FRANKLIN	-0.1036	0.3427	0.0551	0.6981	0.3940	-0.1358	-0.5730	-0.3064	0.5493	-0.0550	-0.0399

NORTH KITSAP	-0.1520	0.7018	0.7572	0.2913	-0.8835	-0.6060	-1.1557	0.7063	-0.2539	0.2621	0.5651
NORTH MASON	-0.1571	-0.1409	-0.4601	0.0301	-0.1718	0.5265	-0.8512	1.2266	-1.6374	0.3767	-0.0053
NORTH RIVER	-0.3648	0.3276	-0.4263	-0.5445	0.0812	-1.0808	-0.2507	0.7063	0.2849		0.9638
NORTH THURSTON	0.1217	-0.0200	0.9802	-0.0055	0.7996	0.2778	0.2897	0.7063	0.8141	0.9277	-0.6274
NORTHPORT	1.0122	0.7227	0.8812	1.4772	0.3129	0.2133	2.9490	0.6720	0.5779	-0.4405	0.8485
NORTHSHORE	1.4693	0.6955	1.3904	1.5872	1.6793	0.7886	-1.1867	-0.5921	1.6812	1.2434	0.9362
OAK HARBOR	0.5673	0.8903	-0.2666	0.6981	1.5694	-0.4335	0.4253	-2.1426	0.3760	1.1409	0.2681
OAKVILLE	-1.3253	-1.5029	-2.0199	-1.7151	-0.1827	-0.0089	-0.0931	0.0387	-1.6050		-0.9500
OCEAN BEACH	0.5241	0.4511	0.3202	0.3314	0.1641	0.9987	0.1678	0.2321	-0.0414	0.2995	0.3093
OCOSTA	0.3159	1.1218	-1.0163	-1.8341	-0.6293	-0.3516	-0.7837	0.4962	-0.8905	-0.8379	1.4325
ODESSA	0.0088	-0.0168	0.1996	-0.0360	0.2721	-0.0678	0.2754	-0.5921	-0.1667	-1.0015	0.4342
OKANOGAN	1.1477	0.8328	0.5498	0.2765	1.0230	1.3430	-0.9775	-3.0160	1.4383	0.2917	0.9626
OLYMPIA	0.9896	0.9416	-1.0064	0.0301	0.6062	0.6152	-0.1968	-0.1699	1.5698	0.4961	0.8377
OMAK	0.4439	0.6205	-0.5997	0.0301	-0.6750	1.4019	-1.3479	-0.5921	-0.4843	-1.2408	0.8936
ONALASKA	0.2718	0.6979	0.1996	-0.4539	0.2672	-0.8865	0.0903	0.7063	-1.0682	0.1662	0.9828
ORCAS ISLAND	1.4542	1.2019	0.8812	0.6040	0.6547	1.2267	-0.3611	1.3456	0.7141	-0.4947	1.4420
ORCHARD PRAIRIE	-2.0031	-2.6224	-0.0433	-1.7151	-0.7125	-0.6391	-0.5086	0.7063	-2.1920	-1.9183	-3.3009
ORONDO	-0.9800	-1.6097	-0.5636	-1.8420	0.9647	0.0327	1.2091	0.7979	-1.0604	-0.3082	-2.7199
OROVILLE	0.0434	-0.0413	-0.9144	-0.4440	-0.5444	0.2530	-0.3602	0.1535	-0.8640	0.1935	0.3965
ORTING	1.2037	1.4820	0.8253	0.4151	0.0339	0.1964	0.3986	1.8009	0.0753	0.1274	1.5316
OTHELLO	-0.7910	-0.3480	-1.7382	-1.8420	-1.0770	-0.0999	-2.1202	-0.6459	0.3104	0.1134	-0.3914
PALOUSE	-0.1651	-0.9202	-0.1889	-1.0778	-0.0968	1.0766	0.7921	-1.2798	-0.5556	0.5469	-1.0329
PASCO	0.5089	0.3394	1.1551		0.9797	-0.4716	0.4627	0.1535	0.9110	1.7272	-0.3109
PATEROS	-1.2755	-0.2792	-1.4786	-0.5445	-1.0135	-1.3100	-0.8500	0.2321	-1.0481	-1.2860	-0.2665
PE ELL	-1.4771	-0.6924	-1.8129	-1.7151	-1.4769	-0.9527	-0.4058	-0.9069	-1.2239	-0.9055	-0.3250
PENINSULA	0.3331	1.2497	1.3077	1.5872	0.7458	-0.7189	-1.6780	-1.1495	0.3723	0.5500	0.7059
PIONEER	0.9938	1.2603	-0.0436	-0.4539	-0.3303	0.7263	-0.4269	-1.2798	0.7413	0.7446	1.1783
POMEROY	-1.3048	-1.6378	-1.4549	-1.7151	-0.6537	-0.1399	-1.1777	1.2662	-1.2056	-2.1625	-0.8618
PORT ANGELES	-0.9765	-0.4656	-0.1456	0.1910	-0.6124	-0.0854	-1.2451	0.3114	-1.2936	-0.3554	-0.6071
PORT TOWNSEND	0.5092	0.7653	1.3010	0.0301	0.5941	-0.0597	1.0144	-1.1495	0.1460	0.4779	0.6333
PRESCOTT	-0.1356	0.1847	-0.2308	-0.0984	-0.5340	0.3395	-0.0356	-0.5921	-0.5698		0.5003

PROSSER	0.5922	0.4180	0.1996	-0.4539	0.1592	-0.4341	1.9139	0.0387	0.1464	0.6926	0.7133
PULLMAN	0.7157	0.1675	0.6616	0.6981	0.6101	1.0652	-0.5420	0.1535	1.0494	0.7377	0.0613
PUYALLUP	-0.0579	0.1514	-0.7227	0.6981	0.6856	-0.4266	-1.2858	0.7063	0.0101	1.2652	-0.2725
QUEETS	-3.5630	-2.5502	-1.7727	-0.5445	-3.1446	-3.7256	-1.5216	-1.2338	-0.8169		-2.2569
QUILCENE	0.5792	1.3007	0.3729	-0.8866	-0.2219	0.7031	0.4185	1.2662	-0.7888	0.3559	0.7458
QUILLAYUTE VALLEY	0.2851	0.1858	0.3141	0.2913	0.4341	0.5869	-0.9603	1.2934	0.2748	0.0406	0.1953
QUINCY	0.9477	0.3116	0.6616	1.5872	1.0404	1.0876	1.0326	-0.9615	0.8460	0.8728	0.1443
RAINIER	0.5300	0.2068	-0.2247	-0.0464	-1.0346	0.5422	1.4911	0.0387	-0.0104	0.3857	0.5290
RAYMOND	-0.3548	-0.0375	-0.0430	-1.0778	-0.6781	-0.2988	-0.4598	2.4295	-0.5970	-1.2264	0.1755
REARDAN-EDWALL	0.7901	0.3999	0.8812	-0.0464	0.1207	0.7710	1.4282	0.6720	1.3327	-0.0761	0.2954
RENTON	1.8235	1.2680	2.1481	1.7784	1.4252	1.0318	0.2779	1.2934	1.4502	1.1103	1.2075
REPUBLIC	-0.2094	-0.2841	-0.9292	0.6181	0.0413	-0.1661	-0.5793	-0.3064	-0.2223	-0.6722	0.2341
RICHLAND	0.1249	-0.2184	-0.6488	-1.0778	-0.4424	0.9857	0.2846	-0.3996	-0.1871	0.2789	-0.1195
RIDGEFIELD	-0.7932	-0.2576	-0.9598	-0.5155	-0.3572	-0.9796	-1.9197	-0.5921	-0.5875	0.6009	-0.1766
RITZVILLE	0.7261	0.3907	0.9817	0.9383	-0.5858	1.1543	0.9731	0.6880	0.4774	1.0030	0.0880
RIVERSIDE	0.3264	0.3054	0.9399	1.7784	0.0292	0.0414	1.1907	0.1535	0.7360	0.0223	0.2109
RIVERVIEW	0.6593	0.8753	1.7218	1.5872	0.6216	0.2165	0.2265	-1.0392	1.2568	0.6318	0.4294
ROCHESTER	-0.8140	-1.0694	-2.0068	-1.7151	-0.5709	-0.3481	-0.0487	-1.1495	-0.9782	-0.4539	-0.1147
ROSALIA	-0.7615	-0.2688	-1.6023	-0.9557	-1.6820	-0.5704	0.6113	0.2321	-0.1667	-0.9637	-0.2532
ROYAL	-1.3960	-0.8807	-1.3397	-0.9557	-0.8040	-1.0132	-1.2058	-0.8861	0.7276	-0.5820	-1.1320
SAN JUAN ISLAND	-0.2161	-0.4988	0.6694	-1.0778	-0.9117	0.2588	0.9796	1.8391	0.4252	-0.5513	-0.3974
SEATTLE	1.1004	0.6778	1.4707	1.5872	1.0950	0.7580	0.8285	0.2321	-1.1697	1.1601	0.7577
SEDRO-WOOLLEY	1.7622	1.4718	1.6602	0.6981	1.4239	0.5285	0.9905	0.6720	1.9849	1.0916	1.1603
SELAH	-0.6756	-1.1004	-0.3533	-0.4440	0.1665	0.0590	0.0519	-0.5921	1.3784	-0.6698	-1.6011
SELKIRK	-0.0585	-0.5605	-0.3854	-1.8420	-0.8256	0.5663	0.4142	-1.2798	0.1429	-0.2734	0.0639
SEQUIM	1.1759	0.3757	1.7114	0.6981	-0.1983	0.8738	0.9316	-0.0490	1.9137	0.6635	0.7286
SHELTON	0.7845	1.1761	0.5558	0.0301	1.6698	-0.4802	0.6215	0.1535	0.0197	0.4366	0.9117
SHORELINE	1.1440	1.1644	1.6602	1.5872	1.6379	-0.3632	0.0116	0.1535	1.3407	1.2459	0.7835
SKYKOMISH	0.0966	-0.0339	0.7728	-1.8341	-0.1659	1.3542	0.0418	0.5597	-1.3471	-0.0628	0.0583
SNOHOMISH	1.2670	0.6425	1.1362	1.5872	1.2374	0.8912	0.4236	0.3114	0.9221	2.1257	0.1870

SNOQUALMIE VALLEY	-0.7877	-1.0719	-1.0203	0.6181	0.1478	0.2824	0.2903	0.7060	-0.2107	-0.4483	-1.6011
SOAP LAKE	-0.4551	0.1238	-0.2785	-0.5155	-1.4322	-0.6141	0.9362	1.4547	-0.0151	-0.1268	-0.2325
SOUTH BEND	-0.2960	-0.5208	-1.4786	-0.5445	-0.5455	0.2914	-1.0854	1.9351	-0.0064	-3.7701	0.0401
SOUTH KITSAP	1.0816	1.0892	1.5760	1.5872	0.8429	-0.1749	0.1711	1.2662	0.9163	1.1532	0.8894
SOUTH WHIDBEY	1.0346	1.2241	0.6616	0.6981	0.5577	-0.5860	1.7452	0.1535	1.3989	0.2567	1.0559
SOUTHSIDE	-0.6883	-0.0063	-1.1643	-1.7151	-0.6755		0.8492	-3.1063	0.2339	0.6926	0.2961
SPOKANE	1.1678	0.7265	1.3904	1.5872	2.1084	1.0809	1.2898	-2.6292	0.8186	1.3248	0.0901
SPRAGUE	-0.9082	-1.4805	-0.0627	-0.9557	-0.9006	-0.4425	0.2283	0.7803	-0.0988	-3.7701	-0.6655
ST. JOHN	-1.2051	-1.3613	-0.2371	-0.1067	0.4217	-0.5413	0.4060	-1.8991	-0.7170	-2.1680	-1.1515
STANWOOD-CAMANO	0.4724	0.7660	1.5498	1.5872	1.3539	-1.1983	0.6467	0.3114	-0.4396	0.2238	0.7387
STEILACOOM	0.5559	0.6302	0.0988	0.0301	0.1478	0.7126	0.5313	-1.8151	-0.5517	0.9334	0.5215
STEVENSON-CARSON	-1.7503	-1.6851	-1.5358	-0.5445	0.2698	-4.7804	-0.9325	-1.2338	-0.3404	0.6990	-1.5384
SULTAN	-0.2361	0.1291	-0.6527	0.6181	-0.4152	-0.0855	-0.0181	-0.8427	0.1169	0.3995	-0.1220
SUMNER	0.7321	1.1550	0.6616	0.6981	1.2494	-1.3971	0.0622	-0.5921	0.2982	0.9139	0.9692
SUNNYSIDE	0.7596	0.7667	1.0415	0.0301	-0.4625	0.5253	0.9846	-0.1273	-0.2921	0.8023	0.7695
TACOMA	1.5999	1.0633	0.8942	1.5872	2.2717	0.4967	0.7370	-0.8427	0.8862	1.1948	1.0432
TAHOLA	-0.3121	-0.7388	-0.3228	-0.5445	-0.2440	0.0327	0.2324	0.1535	-1.5039	-0.2287	0.4469
TAHOMA	-0.4078	-0.2312	-0.1288	-0.8866	-0.0096	-0.6018	-0.8890	-0.2240	0.1853	-1.0493	0.2078
TEKOA	-1.4066	-0.7756	-1.5087	-1.7151	-0.6537	-2.2696	0.0004	-1.2338	-1.2119		0.2534
TENINO	-1.1264	-0.9868	-1.7830	-1.8420	-1.3401	-0.2199	-0.4100	0.0387	0.0144	-0.4322	-1.0875
THORPE	-0.4500	-0.4142	-0.1401	0.6181	-0.1146	0.5115	-1.2015	1.3216	-0.5868	-0.6172	-0.5824
TOLEDO	-1.4629	-1.2263	-1.5201	-1.7151	-0.8510	-2.9226	0.0680	-0.3064	0.1803	-0.9802	-0.1146
TONASKET	0.1043	-0.5040	-0.2139	-0.8866	-0.2945	0.5025	1.8874	0.1535	1.4566	-0.4205	-0.6159
TOPPENISH	-0.0841	0.0031	-0.0482	0.2913	0.3940	-0.3077	-0.3818	-0.2066	0.2010	0.4988	-0.0609
TOUCHET	-1.8465	-1.0906	-3.0801		-0.3729	-1.6636	-2.4059	0.5597	-1.9859	-2.2123	0.1296
TOUTLE LAKE	0.6495	1.3234	0.1459	0.9383	-0.8510	-1.1540	0.0462	0.0387	0.8270		1.6589
TROUT LAKE	-0.6576	-0.3483	-0.4579	-0.9476	-1.4524	-0.3665	-0.2626	-0.0399	0.0079	-0.6926	-0.0916
TUKWILA	2.2544	1.8459	2.1803	1.5872	2.3433	1.3450	0.3925	-0.2066	1.1803	1.6309	1.3878
TUMWATER	1.3256	1.0230	0.4842	-0.0055	1.5580	0.1490	0.7721	0.7063	1.5421	0.8951	0.8889

UNION GAP	0.1190	-0.1568	-1.1708	0.3314	0.8854	-0.3011	0.2980	-0.5921	0.6742	0.7910	-0.1245
UNIVERSITY PLACE	1.1093	1.1872	0.2164	0.6981	1.8937	-0.1755	-0.9588	0.7063	1.5360	0.3683	0.9823
VANCOUVER	-0.9074	-0.2874	-0.6016	0.0017	-0.0509	-0.9655	0.2804	-0.5921	-1.6777	-1.1571	-0.0864
VASHON ISLAND	0.8882	1.1890	-0.1831	0.2913	-0.0510	-0.2379	-0.4133	-0.2066	-0.9592	0.2478	1.8522
WAHKIAKUM	-0.6880	0.1116	-0.2906	-0.1067	-3.1446	-0.4474	-0.4050	-0.3996	-0.2340	0.0949	-0.2944
WAHLUKE	1.2405	0.5068	1.1232	0.6040	1.1575	0.7562	0.1580	0.3114	0.6313	0.7064	0.9733
WAITSBURG	-1.3481	-1.5840	-0.6551	0.4240	-2.2367	-0.1345	-0.2511	0.0387	-0.2679		-2.1148
WALLA WALLA	-0.2796	0.3898	0.8942	0.0301	-0.1500	0.0905	-0.4566	0.7979	-0.1096	0.3490	-0.2997
WAPATO	-0.0705	0.5590	0.5449	0.2913	-0.2673	-0.5256	-0.3566	-0.3064	0.1129	0.0618	0.3599
WARDEN	1.6005	0.5884	0.4842	-0.0055	0.9217	2.1195	1.0556	-2.6292	0.8188	0.0556	1.1283
WASHOUGAL	1.0707	1.0066	0.4842	-0.0055	1.1130	0.5465	1.0124	-1.3843	-0.5697	1.3341	0.9133
WASHTUCNA	-2.1704	-2.4984	-2.0199	-1.7151	0.5017	-1.1332	-0.9822	0.7063	-1.7983		-2.1144
WATERVILLE	-0.4231	-0.4480	-0.5678	0.3314	0.0102	0.3048	0.3948	-0.3238	-0.0933	-0.8780	-0.4051
WELLPINIT	-0.6370	-1.0965	-0.0430	-1.0778	-0.7714	0.3838	0.2851	0.1535	0.0516	0.6343	-1.5964
WENATCHEE	1.1242	1.0078	1.6602	1.5872	1.4856	1.1691	-0.7949	-0.1699	1.2189	0.4294	0.5570
WEST VALLEY (SPK)	1.1133	0.9697	0.7879	0.2765	1.5580	0.8159	-0.7151	1.2662	0.5014	-0.2824	0.9711
WEST VALLEY (YAK)	0.4169	0.6299	0.9817	0.3314	0.1806	-0.1801	0.0849	0.0387	0.0775	0.7078	0.6272
WHITE PASS	0.2059	0.0843	0.2041	-0.0464	0.2103	0.2554	0.6848	0.0387	-0.2570	0.1279	0.2012
WHITE RIVER	1.4085	1.3633	1.0415	0.6981	0.7637	0.9442	0.8035	0.1535	0.2197	1.0931	1.1228
WHITE SALMON	-1.0058	-0.3354	-0.9205	-0.9557	-1.4322	-1.2274	-1.4689	0.0387	0.4059	-0.5661	-0.1544
WILBUR	-1.4888	-0.4319	-0.3888	-0.9557	-1.4350	-0.4315	-0.0953	-1.4041	-3.3101	-0.7421	-0.6776
WILLAPA VALLEY	1.1650	0.6117	0.1991	0.9383	0.2635	1.6350	1.4442	-0.2066	0.9140	0.9819	0.1644
WILSON CREEK	-0.6540	-0.8279	-0.9712	-0.5445	-0.2279	0.2514	0.3841	-1.7312	-0.2923	-0.2355	-0.8197
WINLOCK	-0.2915	-1.1996	0.7277	-0.8866	-0.2279	0.5870	1.6439	1.2662	0.8247	-0.1418	-1.4493
WISHKAH	-0.4513	-0.0513	-0.0790	-0.9476	0.7502	-1.9924	-0.4158	1.8391	-0.9993	-0.7421	0.2741
WISHRAM	-0.5847	-0.2707	-0.3191	-0.9557	-0.2140	0.1146	-0.0124	-0.1025	-1.0094	-0.7351	-0.1750
WOODLAND	0.5217	0.8180	0.0004	0.0301	-0.8274	-0.3542	-1.0395	0.7063	0.4398	0.7148	1.0762
YAKIMA	0.6217	0.9761	-0.1647	0.0301	0.6235	-0.6716	0.2238	-1.9395	0.0521	0.2849	1.2448
YELM	0.7250	0.9258	0.3373	1.7784	0.3425	0.3546	-1.6116	-0.5921	0.5252	0.8006	0.8483
ZILLAH	-0.1398	-0.6630	0.6616	0.0301	0.6557	0.5761	0.2354	0.1535	0.8861	-0.4794	-0.9061

Table 4: Measure Similarity: Pearson Correlations

	Full	Restricted	Cherry Picked	Accessibility	Association	Evaluation	Grievance	Layoffs	Benefits & Leaves	Hiring & Transfer	Workload
Full	1.0000										
Restricted	0.8758***	1.0000									
Cherry Picked	0.7498***	0.6456***	1.0000								
Accessibility	0.6495***	0.6161***	0.7244***	1.0000							
Association	0.6565***	0.5575***	0.5678***	0.5718***	1.0000						
Evaluation	0.6324***	0.3895***	0.3853***	0.2907***	0.2288***	1.0000					
Grievance	0.3391***	0.1621**	0.2895***	0.0573	0.1364*	0.2481***	1.0000				
Layoffs	0.0368	-0.0211	0.1434*	0.0586	-0.0282	0.0178	0.0219	1.0000			
Benefits/Leaves	0.5787***	0.3577***	0.4334***	0.3642***	0.3394***	0.2988***	0.2298***	-0.0346	1.0000		
Hiring/Transfers	0.5935***	0.5469***	0.5071***	0.5250***	0.4998***	0.2294***	0.1038+	-0.1197	0.3725***	1.0000	
Workload	0.7693***	0.8952***	0.4942***	0.4742***	0.4208***	0.3191***	0.0997+	-0.0040	0.2776***	0.311***	1.0000

Table 5: Contract Provisions by Category

	Category	Provisions	Frequency
1	Accessibility1	Does the CBA contain at least 170 provisions?	202
2	Accessibility1a	Does the CBA contain at least 202 provisions?	134
3	Accessibility1ai	Does the CBA contain at least 227 provisions?	67
4	Accessibility2	Is the district contacted at least 2 times?	120
5	Accessibility2a	Is the district contacted at least 3 times?	51
6	Tone1	Is the CBA at least 47 pages?	196
7	Tone1a	Is the CBA at least 63 pages?	132
8	Tone1ai	Is the CBA at least 86 pages?	65
9	Tone2	IS THERE A NO STRIKE/ LOCKOUT CLAUSE/ CONCERTED ACTIVITIES/ WORK STOPPAGE?	140
10	Tone3	CAN INDIVIDUAL SCHOOL SITE FACULTY VOTE TO WAIVE A PORTION OF THE CBA?	53
11	Tone4	CAN CONTRACT BE REOPENED FOR NEGOTIATIONS DURING CONTRACT TERM?	227
12	Tone4a	annually	54
13	Tone4c	upon request and mutual agreement of both parties	191
14	Tone5	CAN ISSUES IN THE CONTRACT BE REOPENED?	160
15	Tone5a	On salary?	113
16	Tone5b	On benefits?	101
17	Tone5c	On any additional articles (other than sal and/or bens)?	103
18	Tone6	IS THERE LANGUAGE IN THE CONTRACT ABOUT SITE-BASED DECISION MAKING?	82
19	Tone7	IS THERE MENTION OF INTEREST BASED BARGAINING (IBB) IN THE CONTRACT?	18
20	Tone8	ARE ANY COMMITTEES THAT INCLUDE BOTH THE DISTRICT/SCHOOL AND ASSOCIATION (UNION) MEMBERS MENTIONED IN THE CBA?	185
21	AssociationI	DOES CONTRACT PROMISE SPECIFIC ASSOCIATION RIGHTS OR LEAVE? (leave for ASSOCIATION members/ presidents)	263
22	Association1	DOES DISTRICT SPECIFY THE NUMBER OF UNION REPRESENTATIVES WHO CAN HAVE LEAVE?	52
23	Association1b	At least 3 reps?	34
24	Association1bi	At least 5 reps?	17
25	Association2	DOES DISTRICT SPECIFY THE NUMBER OF DAYS PER UNION REPRESENTATIVE WHO CAN TAKE ASSOCIATION LEAVE?	58

26	Association2a	At least 8 days?	37
27	Association2ai	At least 12 days?	20
28	Association3	DOES DISTRICT SPECIFY THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF TIME FOR RELEASE TIME OR LEAVE THE ASSOCIATION GETS PER YEAR?	170
29	Association3a	At least 10 days?	138
30	Association3ai	At least 20 days?	97
31	Association3ai1	At least 40 days?	49
32	Association4	DOES THE DISTRICT SPECIFY WHO PAYS FOR THE RELEASE TIME FOR GENERAL ASSOCIATION LEAVE?	197
33	Association4a	Does the Association pay for the release time?	174
34	Association4c	Does the district pay for the release time?	15
35	Association5	DOES THE ASSOCIATION PRESIDENT (OR DESIGNEE) GET (ADDITIONAL) TIME OFF?	78
36	Association6	DOES THE DISTRICT SPECIFY WHO PAYS FOR RELEASE TIME FOR ASSOCIATION PRES LEAVE?	90
37	Association6a	Does the Association pay for the Association pres release time?	78
38	Association7	DOES DISTRICT SPECIFY THE # OF TOTAL DAYS OF RELEASE TIME THE ASSOC PRESIDENT GETS/ YEAR?	84
39	Association7a	At least 9 days?	38
40	Association7ai	At least 19 days?	25
41	Association7ai1	At least 90 days?	14
42	Association7c	Full Time	28
43	Association8	DOES CONTRACT SPECIFY THAT PRESIDENT CAN RETURN TO ORIGINAL OR COMPARABLE POSITION UPON RETURN?	30
44	Association11	DOES DISTRICT SPECIFY THE NUMBER OF TOTAL DAYS OF RELEASE TIME THE ASSOCIATION GETS TO NEGOTIATE?	16
45	Association12	DOES DISTRICT PAY FOR / COVER ANY OR ALL OF THE RELEASE TIME FOR NEGOTIATIONS FOR UNION MEMBERS?	40
46	Association12a	Does the Association pay for the negotiation release time?	25
47	Association13	DOES THE CONTRACT ALLOW FOR ANY ADDITIONAL SPECIFIC ASSOCIATION RIGHTS? (more than facilities, equipment, bulletin board and mail/mailboxes)	188
48	Association14	DOES THE CONTRACT SPECIFY THAT THE ASSOCIATION GETS CONSULTATION RIGHTS ?	113
49	Association14a	Assoc REP/ PRES/ MEMS meet with SUPERINTENDENT/ DISTRICT-LEVEL	89
50	Association14b	Assoc SITE REP/ SITE PRES/ MEMS meet with PRINCIPAL/ SCHOOL-LEVEL	29

51	Association15	DOES THE CBA SPECIFY THAT ASSOC CAN CONSULT ON ANY OF THE FOLLOWING ISSUES?	128
52	Association15a	budget and fiscal	61
53	Association15b	calendar/ schedule (incl hours and adjunct duties)	56
54	Association15c	employment and personnel policies (teachers, admins, long term subs, etc; hiring, interviewing, compensation etc)	34
55	Association15e	site based management/ site-specific issues	28
56	Association15f	staff development	15
57	Association15g	student assessments, discipline and supervision policies	12
58	Association15h	any affect on members	15
59	Association15i	class size	11
60	Association15j	others?	44
61	Transfers1	DOES CBA PRIORITIZE WHICH MEMBERS GET TRANSFERS?	158
62	Transfers1a	DOES CBA DICTATE THAT VOLUNTARY TRANSFERS GET PREFERENCE AHEAD OF INVOLUNTARY TRANSFERS?	126
63	Transfers1b	DOES CBA HOLD THAT THOSE BEING INVOL TRANSF GET PREFERENCE AHEAD OF VOL TRANSFERS?	18
64	Transfers1e	OTHER?	10
65	Transfers2	DOES CBA OUTLINE FACTORS CONSIDERED WHEN TRANSFERING MEMBERS OVERALL?	230
66	Transfers2a	clear and compelling needs for the efficient operation of the district/ program needs/ welfare of students/ educational needs of district	165
67	Transfers2b	credentials held by the respective member of the unit in relation to the position requirements/ academic qualifications	145
68	Transfers2c	qualifications of the unit member and the necessary or desirable qualifications of the positions	183
69	Transfers2d	major or minor fields of study	88
70	Transfers2e	special job-related skills or talents	58
71	Transfers2f	appropriate experience	108
72	Transfers2g	principal / site administrator preferences	24
73	Transfers2h	teacher preference	74
74	Transfers2i	seniority in school building	46
75	Transfers2j	seniority in district	103
76	Transfers2ji	seniority in district is the deciding factor in who gets transferred	14

77	Transfers2jii	seniority in district if all else (credential, qualification, fit with instructional reqs) is "substantially equal"	41
78	Transfers2jiii	seniority in district is considered	30
79	Transfers2k	Performance improvement/ teacher quality / evaluations	29
80	Transfers3	DOES CBA HOLD THAT MEMS CAN BE VOLUNTARILY TRANSFERED AFTER THE START OF THE SCHOOL YEAR?	74
81	Transfers4	Does CBA address seniority as a factor in deciding who is voluntarily transferred?	132
82	Transfers4a	SENIORITY NOT A FACTOR	20
83	Transfers4b	district considers seniority in the decision to fill a vacancy if all else is equal between members (CONSIDERED)	46
84	Transfers4c	if all else is equal between members, teacher with the most seniority fills vacant position if 2 or more apply (MORE THAN JUST CONSIDERED)	48
85	Transfers4d	teacher with most seniority fills position if 2 or more apply (MORE THAN JUST CONSIDERED, DECIDING FACTOR)	15
86	Transfers5	Does CBA stipulate that at least one member or a representative of the members must be present at interviews and/or involved in interview/ hiring process for voluntary transfer applicants??	21
87	Transfers6	Does CBA specify that any particular group is ineligible for voluntary transfer?	14
88	Transfers7	DOES CBA HOLD THAT MEMBERS CAN BE INVOLUNTARILY TRANSFERRED AFTER THE START OF THE SCHOOL YEAR?	97
89	Transfers8	DOES CBA SAY THAT MEMBERS WHO ARE INVOL TRANSFERRED (FOR NON-"CAUSE" REASONS) RETAIN ANY PREFERENTIAL RIGHTS TO RETURN TO THAT SITE/POSITION IF SPOT OPENS?	59
90	Transfers8c	For at least two years?	12
91	Transfers9	Does CBA address seniority as a factor in deciding who is involuntarily transferred?	136
92	Transfers9a	SENIORITY NOT A FACTOR	12
93	Transfers9b	seniority will be considered, all else equal	42
94	Transfers9c	All else equal, seniority is the deciding factor	53
95	Transfers9d	Seniority is the deciding factor, regardless of other characteristics	25
96	Transfers10	DOES CBA PLACE A LIMIT ON THE FREQUENCY WITH WHICH MEMBERS MAY BE INVOLUNTARILY TRANSFERRED?	58
97	Transfers11	DOES CBA OUTLINE SPECIFIC CAUSES FOR WHICH A MEMBER MAY BE INVOLUNTARILY TRANSFERRED ?	135
98	Transfers11a	FOR GOOD OF/ BEST OPERATIONAL NEEDS OF DISTRICT	116
99	Transfers11b	PLACE RESTRCTIONS ON REASONS FOR INVOL TRANSFER (IE, JUST FOR ENROLL CHANGE, ELIM OF PROGRAM…)	37

100	Transfers11bi	ENROLLMENT CHANGE	26
101	Transfers11bii	ELIMINATION OF PROGRAM	23
102	Transfers11biii	CLOSURE OF SCHOOL	14
103	Transfers11biv	Other?	20
104	Transfers12	DOES CBA PLACE ANY RESTRICTIONS ON WHO CAN BE INVOL TRANSFERRED?	21
105	Transfers13	DOES CBA SPECIFY TREATMENT OF INVOLUNTARILY-TRANSFERRED MEMBERS' PREFERENCES FOR VACANCIES?	54
106	Transfers13a	CBA specifies that transferree can indicate his/her preferences from list of available vacancies	33
107	Transfers13b	if invol transfer, district honors request among list of vacancies if meets reqs	13
108	Transfers13c	CBA specifies that seniority rights allow most senior invol transferred teacher first choice of vacant spots	10
109	Transfers14	CBA SPECIFIES THAT NO MEMBER CAN BE INVOLUNTARILY TRANSFERRED IF THERE IS ANOTHER MEM AS QUALIFIED REQUESTING A VOLUNTARY TRANSFER TO THAT POSITION	70
110	Transfers15	DOES CBA SPECIFY THE ORDER IN WHICH DISTRICT CAN CONSIDER NEW EMPLOYEES FOR VACANCIES?	194
111	Transfers15a	district allowed to "fly" vacant positions outside the district (before interviewing all within-dist members)	16
112	Transfers15b	current employed teachers can apply and/or will be considered for a vacant position before new personnel are considered for the assignment	146
113	Transfers15c	current employed teachers will be assigned to a vacant position before new personnel are considered for the assignment	39
114	Transfers16	If position opened within the school year is filled with a probationary / temporary teacher, will it be re-opened the following year to members seeking trans/reass?	10
115	Transfers17	DOES CBA REQUIRE THAT DISTRICT POST ALL CERTIFICATED VACANCIES/ MAKE THEM AVAILABLE TO TEACHERS IN THE DISTRICT?	214
116	Transfers18	DOES CBA REQUIRE THAT DISTRICT CANNOT FILL VACANCY WITHIN A SET AMOUNT OF TIME AFTER VACANCY HAS BEEN POSTED/ MADE KNOWN?	101
117	Transfers18a	Within at least 7 days?	26
118	Transfers18ai	Within at least 10 days?	11
119	ClassSizeI	Does the CBA address class size in the contract?	226
120	ClassSize1	Does the CBA specify a given class size?	199
121	ClassSize2	Does the District/ Board decide on class size w/o negotiatinng w/ union?	92
122	ClassSize4a	Does the CBA have a negotiated class size for KINDERGARTEN?	81

123	ClassSize4ai	Is the negotiated class size as many as 24 students?	53
124	ClassSize4ai1	Is the negotiated class size as many as 23 students?	39
125	ClassSize4ai1a	Is the negotiated class size as many as 22 students?	25
126	ClassSize4b	Does the CBA have a MAXIMUM class size for KINDERGARTEN?	157
127	ClassSize4bi	Is the MAXIMUM class size as many as 26 students?	130
128	ClassSize4bi1	Is the MAXIMUM class size as many as 24 students?	84
129	ClassSize4bi1a	Is the MAXIMUM class size as many as 23 students?	56
130	ClassSize5a	Does the CBA have a negotiated class size for FIRST GRADE?	81
131	ClassSize5ai	Is the negotiated class size as many as 25 students?	66
132	ClassSize5ai1	Is the negotiated class size as many as 24 students?	48
133	ClassSize5ai1a	Is the negotiated class size as many as 23 students?	31
134	ClassSize5b	Does the CBA have a MAXIMUM class size for FIRST GRADE?	157
135	ClassSize5bi	Is the MAXIMUM class size as many as 26 students?	121
136	ClassSize5bi1	Is the MAXIMUM class size as many as 25 students?	103
137	ClassSize5bi1a	Is the MAXIMUM class size as many as 24 students?	62
138	ClassSize6a	Does the CBA have a negotiated class size for SECOND GRADE?	81
139	ClassSize6ai	Is the negotiated class size as many as 25 students?	62
140	ClassSize6ai1	Is the negotiated class size as many as 24 students?	45
141	ClassSize6ai1a	Is the negotiated class size as many as 23 students?	28
142	ClassSize6b	Does the CBA have a MAXIMUM class size for SECOND GRADE?	157
143	ClassSize6bi	Is the MAXIMUM class size as many as 27 students?	132
144	ClassSize6bi1	Is the MAXIMUM class size as many as 25 students?	91
145	ClassSize6bi1a	Is the MAXIMUM class size as many as 24 students?	48
146	ClassSize7a	Does the CBA have a negotiated class size for THIRD GRADE?	81
147	ClassSize7ai	Is the negotiated class size as many as 26 students?	69
148	ClassSize7ai1	Is the negotiated class size as many as 25 students?	57
149	ClassSize7ai1a	Is the negotiated class size as many as 24 students?	33
150	ClassSize7b	Does the CBA have a MAXIMUM class size for THIRD GRADE?	157
151	ClassSize7bi	Is the MAXIMUM class size as many as 27 students?	123

152	ClassSize7bi1	Is the MAXIMUM class size as many as 26 students?	100
153	ClassSize7bi1a	Is the MAXIMUM class size as many as 25 students?	76
154	ClassSize8a	Does the CBA have a negotiated class size for FOURTH GRADE?	80
155	ClassSize8ai	Is the negotiated class size as many as 28 students?	69
156	ClassSize8ai1	Is the negotiated class size as many as 26 students?	45
157	ClassSize8ai1a	Is the negotiated class size as many as 25 students?	33
158	ClassSize8b	Does the CBA have a MAXIMUM class size for FOURTH GRADE?	158
159	ClassSize8bi	Is the MAXIMUM class size as many as 29 students?	128
160	ClassSize8bi1	Is the MAXIMUM class size as many as 27 students?	80
161	ClassSize8bi1a	Is the MAXIMUM class size as many as 26 students?	50
162	ClassSize9a	Does the CBA have a negotiated class size for FIFTH GRADE?	80
163	ClassSize9ai	Is the negotiated class size as many as 28 students?	65
164	ClassSize9ai1	Is the negotiated class size as many as 27 students?	47
165	ClassSize9ai1a	Is the negotiated class size as many as 25 students?	24
166	ClassSize9b	Does the CBA have a MAXIMUM class size for FIFTH GRADE?	157
167	ClassSize9bi	Is the MAXIMUM class size as many as 29 students?	121
168	ClassSize9bi1	Is the MAXIMUM class size as many as 28 students?	96
169	ClassSize9bi1a	Is the MAXIMUM class size as many as 27 students?	57
170	ClassSize10a	Does the CBA have a negotiated class size for SIXTH GRADE?	81
171	ClassSize10ai	Is the negotiated class size as many as 29 students?	61
172	ClassSize10ai1	Is the negotiated class size as many as 28 students?	49
173	ClassSize10ai1a	Is the negotiated class size as many as 26 students?	25
174	ClassSize10b	Does the CBA have a MAXIMUM class size for SIXTH GRADE?	147
175	ClassSize10bi	Is the MAXIMUM class size as many as 30 students?	119
176	ClassSize10bi1	Is the MAXIMUM class size as many as 29 students?	84
177	ClassSize10bi1a	Is the MAXIMUM class size as many as 28 students?	61
178	ClassSize11a	Does the CBA have a negotiated class size for SEVENTH GRADE?	76
179	ClassSize11ai	Is the negotiated class size as many as 30 students?	63
180	ClassSize11ai1	Is the negotiated class size as many as 29 students?	37

181	ClassSize11ai1a	Is the negotiated class size as many as 27 students?	17
182	ClassSize11b	Does the CBA have a MAXIMUM class size for SEVENTH GRADE?	134
183	ClassSize11bi	Is the MAXIMUM class size as many as 32 students?	116
184	ClassSize11bi1	Is the MAXIMUM class size as many as 30 students?	82
185	ClassSize11bi1a	Is the MAXIMUM class size as many as 29 students?	44
186	ClassSize12a	Does the CBA have a negotiated class size for EIGHTH GRADE?	76
187	ClassSize12ai	Is the negotiated class size as many as 30 students?	61
188	ClassSize12ai1	Is the negotiated class size as many as 29 students?	35
189	ClassSize12ai1a	Is the negotiated class size as many as 27 students?	16
190	ClassSize12b	Does the CBA have a MAXIMUM class size for EIGHTH GRADE?	134
191	ClassSize12bi	Is the MAXIMUM class size as many as 32 students?	115
192	ClassSize12bi1	Is the MAXIMUM class size as many as 30 students?	81
193	ClassSize12bi1a	Is the MAXIMUM class size as many as 29 students?	44
194	ClassSize13a	Does the CBA have a negotiated class size for NINTH THROUGH TWELFTH GRADES?	68
195	ClassSize13ai	Is the negotiated class size as many as 31 students?	47
196	ClassSize13ai1	Is the negotiated class size as many as 29 students?	24
197	ClassSize13ai1a	Is the negotiated class size as many as 27 students?	15
198	ClassSize13b	Does the CBA have a MAXIMUM class size for NINTH THROUGH TWELFTH GRADES?	121
199	ClassSize13bi	Is the MAXIMUM class size as many as 32 students?	100
200	ClassSize13bi1	Is the MAXIMUM class size as many as 31 students?	65
201	ClassSize13bi1a	Is the MAXIMUM class size as many as 30 students?	53
202	ClassSize14	DOES CBA SPECIFY THAT DISTRICT BALANCE CLASSROOMS W/IN SPECIFIC TIME PERIOD?	72
203	ClassSize14a	Within 15 days?	48
204	ClassSize14ai	Within 10 days?	38
205	ClassSize14ai1	Within 7 days?	18
206	ClassSize15	DOES CBA SPECIFY THAT DIST TAKE SOME ACTION IF CEILING (Cap on number of students) IS EXCEEDED?	203
207	ClassSize15a	TAKE ACTION BY A SPECIFIC TIME?	100
208	ClassSize15ai	Within 10 days?	70

209	ClassSize15ai1	Within 5 days?	27
210	ClassSize15c	DOES CONTRACT SPECIFY PARTICULAR ACTION(S) ?	200
211	ClassSize15ci	affected teachers meet with principal/ supe to discuss/ negotiate alts (and decide on action)	109
212	ClassSize15cii	add new teachers	102
213	ClassSize15ciii	reorganize classes / add classes	99
214	ClassSize15civ	intra-district transfer of classroom teachers	11
215	ClassSize15cv	move students - another school, assignment area	61
216	ClassSize15cvi	increased aide and clerical time	124
217	ClassSize15cvii	increased prep and/ or release time	45
218	ClassSize15cviii	increased budgetary support, materials and supplies	69
219	ClassSize15cix	teachers receive overload compensation (take-home compensation)?	115
220	ClassSize15cx	other?	60
221	ClassSize16	DOES THE CONTRACT SPECIFY CASELOADS/TOTAL NUMBER OF STUDENTS SEEN PER DAY?	49
222	ClassSize16a	As many as 150 students in math?	17
223	ClassSize16c	As many as 150 students in English?	19
224	ClassSize16h	As many as 165 students in PE?	15
225	Evaluation1	DOES CBA INCLUDE THE EVALUATION SHEET/ RUBRIC?	225
226	Evaluation1a	At least 6 standards?	198
227	Evaluation1ai	At least 7 standards?	186
228	Evaluation1ai1	At least 8 standards?	100
229	Evaluation1b	Are there elements/ sub-standards within each larger criteria?	177
230	Evaluation1c	Are teachers rated on each sub-standard/element?	79
231	Evaluation2	CBA SPECIFIES CATEGORIES/ SKILLS FOR TEACHERS' EVALUATIONS?	228
232	Evaluation2a	student achievement	15
233	Evaluation2b	growth in student achievement	19
234	Evaluation2c	Engaging and supporting students in learning	198
235	Evaluation2d	Creating and maintaining effective environments for student learning	222
236	Evaluation2e	Understanding and organizing subject matter for student learning (e.g., curriculum design; instructional techniques)	221

237	Evaluation2f	Planning instruction and designing learning experiences for students	222
238	Evaluation2g	Assessing student learning	163
239	Evaluation2h	Developing as a professional	214
240	Evaluation2i	Other professional responsibilities (eg., site and district responsibilities; non-instructional duties)	153
241	Evaluation4	ARE ANY FACTORS SPECIFICALLY NOT ALLOWED TO BE INCLUDED IN THE EVALUATION?	26
242	Evaluation4a	standardized test scores	14
243	Evaluation5	DOES CBA OUTLINE WHICH SOURCES OF INFORMATION MAY BE USED IN EVALUATION?	197
244	Evaluation5a	classroom observations	191
245	Evaluation5b	self assessment	35
246	Evaluation5c	student input	28
247	Evaluation5d	parent input	26
248	Evaluation5e	site leadership input	23
249	Evaluation5f	other direct observations of teachers	23
250	Evaluation5g	information from evaluation conferences	24
251	Evaluation5i	peer input/information	31
252	Evaluation5k	district or state assessments	10
253	Evaluation5l	other?	18
254	Evaluation6	DOES CBA/ EVAL RUBRIC DEFINE THE FINAL RATING CATEGORIES?	201
255	Evaluation6a	At most 3 categories?	174
256	Evaluation6ai	At most 2 categories?	93
257	Evaluation8	MUST TENURED/PERM TEACHERS HAVE PRE-OBSERVATION MEETING WITH THEIR EVALUATOR?	119
258	Evaluation8a	Is there a timeline by which the pre-observation must have occurred?	50
259	Evaluation8b	Within 4 weeks of the beginning of the school year?	17
260	Evaluation9	DOES CBA SPECIFY HOW MANY FORMAL OBSERVATIONS DISTRICT CAN HAVE FOR TENURED FACULTY?	254
261	Evaluation9a	At least 2 per evaluation cycle?	237
262	Evaluation9b	At least 2 pre-scheduled/announced in advance?	38

263	Evaluation9ci	unspecified number, "additional"	19
264	Evaluation10	DOES CBA SPECIFY THE LENGTH OF THE FORMAL OBSERVATIONS?	226
265	Evaluation10a	At least 30 minutes?	205
266	Evaluation10ai	1 period/ lesson?	11
267	Evaluation12	DOES CBA SPECIFY THE LENGTH OF THE INFORMAL OBSERVATIONS?	21
268	Evaluation13	THE CBA MAKES NO DISTINCTION BETWEEN FORMAL AND INFORMAL OBSERVATIONS.	160
269	Evaluation16	DOES CBA SPECIFY A TIME LIMIT WITHIN WHICH POST-OBS MEETING MUST OCCUR AFTER OBSERVATIONS?	132
270	Evaluation16a	Within 5 days?	82
271	Evaluation16ai	Within 3 days?	37
272	Evaluation17	DOES CBA SPECIFY A TIMELINE BY WHICH THE EVALUATION MUST BE COMPLETED IN THE SCHOOL YEAR?	207
273	Evaluation17a	By May 15?	117
274	Evaluation18	DOES CBA SPECIFY THAT PERM TEACHER WITH 4 YEARS OR MORE EXPERIENCE, WHO MEETS OR EXCEEDS STANDARDS ON PREVIOUS EVAL, OR WHO IS NCLB HI QUAL CAN BE EVAL ON A DIFFERENT SCHEDULE?	121
275	Evaluation18a	Once every year	43
276	Evaluation18b	Less than once per year?	30
277	Evaluation19	CAN PERMANENT/ TENURED MEMBERS IN THE DIST USE AN ALTERNATIVE EVALUATION PROCESS?	227
278	Evaluation19a	For satisfactory evaluation/performance?	191
279	Evaluation19b	is alternative evaluation type specified?	215
280	Evaluation19bi	Short form	176
281	Evaluation19bv	other?	108
282	Evaluation19c	For reasons other than satisfactory evaluation/ performance?	24
283	Evaluation19d	is alternative evaluation type specified?	43
284	Evaluation19di	Short form	27
285	Evaluation19dv	other?	23
286	Evaluation20	CAN A TENURED/PERM TEACHER BE EVALUATED MORE FREQUENTLY THAN ONCE EVERY TWO YEARS?	131
287	Evaluation20c	Unsatisfactory/ needs improvement evaluation	19

288	Evaluation20d	Other?	92
289	Evaluation21	EVALUATIONS ARE HELD FOR PERM/TENURED TEACHERS AT LEAST TWICE PER YEAR?	44
290	Evaluation22	MUST PROB /NON-TENURED TEACHERS HAVE PRE-OBSERVATION MEETING WITH THEIR EVALUATOR?	129
291	Evaluation22a	Is there a timeline by which the pre-observation must have occurred?	59
292	Evaluation22ai	Within 6 weeks from the beginning of the school year?	23
293	Evaluation22ai1	Within 2 weeks from the beginning of the school year?	11
294	Evaluation23	DOES CBA SPECIFY HOW MANY FORMAL OBS DISTRICT CAN HAVE FOR PROBATIONARY /NON-TENURED FACULTY?	255
295	Evaluation23a	at least 2 per evaluation cycle?	222
296	Evaluation23b	at least 2 observations must be pre-scheduled/ announced in advance?	36
297	Evaluation24	DOES CBA SPECIFY THE LENGTH OF THE FORMAL OBSERVATIONS?	183
298	Evaluation26	DOES CBA SPECIFY THE LENGTH OF THE INFORMAL OBSERVATIONS?	23
299	Evaluation27	THE CBA MAKES NO DISTINCTION BETWEEN FORMAL AND INFORMAL OBSERVATIONS.	152
300	Evaluation28	AT LEAST 2 OBSERVATIONS/EVALUATION CYCLE?	226
301	Evaluation29	AT LEAST 3 OBSERVATIONS/YEAR?	33
302	Evaluation30	DOES CBA SPECIFY A TIME LIMIT WITHIN WHICH POST-OBS MEETING MUST OCCUR AFTER OBSERVATIONS?	101
303	Evaluation30a	within 5 days?	63
304	Evaluation30ai	Within 3 days?	35
305	Evaluation31	DOES CBA SPECIFY A TIMELINE BY WHICH THE EVALUATION MUST BE COMPLETED IN THE SCHOOL YEAR?	174
306	Evaluation31a	By May 15?	122
307	Evaluation32	ARE THERE ANY PROB/ NON-TENURED MEMBERS IN THE DIST WHO MAY BE ELIGIBLE TO USE AN ALTERNATIVE EVALUATION PROCESS?	31
308	Evaluation33	FOR WHAT REASONS MIGHT A NON-TENURED/PROB TEACHER BE EVALUATED MORE FREQUENTLY THAN ONCE EVERY TWO YEARS?	90
309	Evaluation33c	Unsatisfactory evaluation	18
310	Evaluation33d	Other?	69
311	Evaluation34	HOW IS A FINAL UNSATISFACTORY/ NEEDS IMPROVEMENT RATING DEFINED?	90
312	Evaluation34a	Unsatisfactory on 1 or more standards?	71

313	Evaluation34d	other?	13
314	Evaluation35	Is there a specified # of observations that must occur before member can receive unsatisfactory/ negative comments?	18
315	Evaluation36	DO MEMBERS WITH UNSATISFACTORY EVALAUTIONS GET ADDITIONAL FORMAL OBSERVATIONS?	45
316	Evaluation37	ARE THERE CONSEQUENCES FOR RECEIVING A NEGATIVE/ "UNSATISFACTORY" PERFORMANCE EVALUATION?	234
317	Evaluation37a	are more formal observations scheduled?	52
318	Evaluation37c	Does district work with teacher to generate an assistance plan/ remediation plan?	196
319	Evaluation37d	Must district take specific actions to support teacher as achieve this plan?	123
320	Evaluation37e	Is teacher referred to PAR?	23
321	Evaluation37h	Other?	86
322	Evaluation38	DOES CBA PUT A TIME LIMIT ON TEACHERS' EVALUATION REPLY RIGHTS?	64
323	Evaluation38a	with in 7 days?	32
324	Evaluation39	DOES CBA ALLOW FOR TEACHERS TO REBUT OR APPEAL A NEGATIVE EVAL?	73
325	Evaluation40	CAN NEGATIVE EVALUATIONS BE REMOVED FROM PERSONNEL FILES?	75
326	Evaluation40a	at least after 3 years?	42
327	Evaluation40ai	at least after 4 years?	12
328	Evaluation41	DOES CBA OUTLINE AN ASSISTANCE PLAN/ REMEDIATION PLAN FOR TEACHERS WITH UNSATISFACTORY EVALS?	202
329	Evaluation41a	What is included in this plan?	199
330	Evaluation41ai	Standards with which teacher needs assistance	169
331	Evaluation41aii	activities to help the teacher improve	162
332	Evaluation41aiii	timeine for activitiy completion	89
333	Evaluation41aiv	evaluation of progress	120
334	Evaluation41av	new evaluation rating	10
335	Evaluation41avi	other?	18
336	Grievance1	DOES CBA SPECIFY THAT A MEMBER SHOULD MAKE AN INFORMAL ATTEMPT TO RESOLVE A GRIEVANCE BEFORE PROCEEDING TO FORMAL GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES?	241
337	Grievance1a	IS THE INFORMAL ATTEMPT REQUIRED?	195
338	Grievance1b	IS THERE A TIME LIMIT ON HOW LONG DOES GRIEVANT HAVE TO REPORT GREIVANCE?	138

339	Grievance1bi	At least 15 days?	125
340	Grievance1bi1	At least 20 days?	107
341	Grievance1bi1a	At least 30 days?	44
342	Grievance1c	IS THERE A TIME LIMIT ON HOW LONG THE DISTRICT HAS TO RESPOND TO/ MUST CONDUCT MEETING/ INFORMAL GRIEVANCE?	61
343	Grievance1ci	WITHIN 5 DAYS?	32
344	Grievance1d	IS THERE A TIME LIMIT ON THE TOTAL LENGTH OF THE INFORMAL PROCEDURE?	62
345	Grievance1di	WITHIN 30 DAYS?	51
346	Grievance1di1	WITHIN 20 DAYS?	33
347	Grievance1di1a	WITHIN 10 DAYS?	11
348	Grievance2	IS THE NUMBER OF LEVELS AFTER INFORMAL LEVEL SPECIFIED IN THE CONTRACT?	267
349	Grievance2a	at least 3 levels?	248
350	Grievance2ai	at least 4 levels?	123
351	Grievance2_1	IS THERE A TIME LIMIT ON HOW LONG DOES THE GRIEVANT HAVE TO FILE FORMAL LEVEL 1 GRIEVANCE?	250
352	Grievance2_1a	at least 10 days?	204
353	Grievance2_1ai	at least 20 days?	135
354	Grievance2_1ai1	at least 30 days?	44
355	Grievance2_2	IS THERE A TIME LIMIT ON HOW LONG DOES THE DISTRICT HAVE TO RESPOND TO FORMAL LEVEL 1 GRIEVANCE?	259
356	Grievance2_2a	within 15 days?	247
357	Grievance2_2ai	within 10 days?	233
358	Grievance2_2ai1	within 5 days?	130
359	Grievance2_3	IS THERE A TIME LIMIT ON HOW LONG DOES THE GRIEVANT HAVE TO FILE FORMAL LEVEL 2 GRIEVANCE?	251
360	Grievance2_3a	at least 5 days?	236
361	Grievance2_3ai	at least 10 days?	109
362	Grievance2_3ai1	at least 15 days?	28
363	Grievance2_4	IS THERE A TIME LIMIT ON HOW LONG DOSE THE DISTRICT HAVE TO RESPOND TO FORMAL LEVEL 2 GRIEVANCE?	253
364	Grievance2_4a	within 15 days?	228

365	Grievance2_4ai	within 10 days?	184
366	Grievance2_4ai1	within 5 days?	74
367	Grievance3	IS THERE A TIME LIMIT ON THE TOTAL LENGTH OF THE FORMAL PROCEDURE?	117
368	Grievance3a	within 103 days?	83
369	Grievance3ai	within 80 days?	58
370	Grievance3ai1	within 60 days?	31
371	Grievance4	IS THERE A TIME LIMIT ON THE TOTAL LENGTH OF THE TOTAL GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE?	83
372	Grievance4a	within 115 days?	59
373	Grievance4ai	within 99 days?	39
374	Grievance4ai1	within 85 days?	27
375	Grievance5	DOES THE GRIEVANCE GO TO THE BOARD?	166
376	Grievance5a	AT OR AFTER LEVEL 3?	126
377	Grievance5b	FINAL LEVEL?	16
378	Grievance5c	IS THE BOARD DECISION FINAL?	12
379	Grievance6	DOES THE GRIEVANCE GO TO MEDIATION?	74
380	Grievance6a	AT OR AFTER LEVEL 2?	55
381	Grievance6ai	AT OR AFTER LEVEL 3?	34
382	Grievance6ai1	AT OR AFTER LEVEL 4?	14
383	Grievance7	DOES THE GRIEVANCE GO TO ARBITRATION?	266
384	Grievance7a	AT OR AFTER LEVEL 4?	132
385	Grievance7ai	AT LEVEL 5?	11
386	Grievance7b	FINAL LEVEL?	263
387	Grievance7c	IS ARBTIRATION DECISION BINDING?	252
388	Grievance7d	DOES CBA OUTLINE AWARDS ABITRATOR CAN MAKE?	28
389	Grievance7dii	Financial reimbursement for other costs	10
390	Grievance7diii	Other?	12
391	Grievance8	DOES THE CBA SPECIFY WHICH PARTY PAYS FOR COSTS OF GRIEVANCE FILING OR RESOLUTION?	258
392	Grievance8d	Does the district and the Association split all costs?	14

393	Grievance8q	Do the district and member split costs of arbitrator?	21
394	Grievance8r	Do the district and Association split costs of arbitrator?	190
395	Grievance8s	Do the parties split costs by those incurring them?	192
396	Grievance8t	COSTS BORNE BY THE PARTY THAT LOSES.	14
397	Benefits1	DOES CBA SPECIFY THAT DISTRICT OFFERS MEDICAL BENEFITS?	247
398	Benefits1c	Does district provide medical benefits for dependents?	38
399	Benefits1d	Does district provide medical benefits for spouse/ domestic partner?	35
400	Benefits2	DOES CBA SPECIFY THAT DISTRICT OFFERS DENTAL BENEFITS?	221
401	Benefits2d	Does district provide dental benefits for dependents?	34
402	Benefits2e	Does district provide dental benefits for spouse/ domestic partner?	31
403	Benefits3	DOES CBA SPECIFY THAT DISTRICT OFFERS VISION BENEFITS?	190
404	Benefits3c	Does district provide vision benefits for dependents?	27
405	Benefits3d	Does district provide vision benefits for spouse/ domestic partner?	28
406	Benefits4	DOES THE DISTRICT SPECIFY $S FOR TOTAL (MEDICAL, DENTAL, & VISION) HEALTH AND WELFARE BENEFITS IN CONTRACT?	88
407	Benefits4a	At least $6500 in total benefits?	14
408	Benefits5	DO MEMS RECEIVE UNUSED BENEFITS?	58
409	Benefits5a	Unused benefits funds get rolled over to following year	12
410	Benefits5c	unused benefits funds can be used to purchase additional benefits	41
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516	Prep8bi		At least 165 minutes/week?	178
517	Prep8bi1		At least 225 minutes/week?	126
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522	Prep8ci1a		At least 255 minutes/week?	42
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524	Prep8di		At least 165 minutes/week?	178
525	Prep8di1		At least 225 minutes/week?	127
526	Prep8di1a		At least 255 minutes/week?	42
527	Prep8e	For 4th grade?		242
528	Prep8ei		At least 165 minutes/week?	178

529	Prep8ei1	At least 225 minutes/week?	127
530	Prep8ei1a	At least 255 minutes/week?	42
531	Prep8f	For 5th grade?	242
532	Prep8fi	At least 165 minutes/week?	178
533	Prep8fi1	At least 225 minutes/week?	130
534	Prep8fi1a	At least 255 minutes/week?	43
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540	Prep8hi	At least 230 minutes/week?	157
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557	Prep9ci	at least 60 minutes/week?	13
558	Prep9d	For 3rd Grade?	26
559	Prep9di	at least 60 minutes/week?	13
560	Prep9e	For 4th grade?	26
561	Prep9ei	at least 60 minutes/week?	13
562	Prep9f	For 5th grade?	26
563	Prep9fi	at least 60 minutes/week?	13
564	Prep9g	For 6th grade?	25
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566	Prep9h	For 7th grade?	25
567	Prep9hi	at least 60 minutes/week?	12
568	Prep9i	For 8th grade?	25
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583	SchoolDay5ci	no more than 330 minutes?	23
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585	SchoolDay5di	no more than 330 minutes?	23
586	SchoolDay5e	For 4th Grade?	41
587	SchoolDay5ei	no more than 330 minutes?	23
588	SchoolDay5f	For 5th Grade?	41
589	SchoolDay5fi	no more than 330 minutes?	23
590	SchoolDay5g	For 6th Grade?	40
591	SchoolDay5gi	no more than 330 minutes?	21
592	SchoolDay5h	For 7th Grade?	39
593	SchoolDay5hi	no more than 315 minutes?	18
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595	SchoolDay5ii	no more than 315 minutes?	18
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